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PRUDENTIAL PROVISIONING, RELEVANT RELOCATION  
Exchange Control Revisited 
INTRODUCTORY SUMMARY
The present economic crises particularly in Asia but also Russia and, by contagion, Latin 
America with partial transmission to and potential contagion in Western Europe/North 
America are in large part caused by excessive short term financial capital movements. That 
they interact with relatively (to very) weak financial system, asset price bubbles over­
investment, misallocated investment and (except in the late Japanese case) overvalued 
exchange rates is not in question. But each of these structural weaknesses has in large 
measure been caused by massive short term capital inflow and exacerbated by massive 
outflows and consequential real economy contraction devalidating investment decisions, asset 
prices and lending serviceability which were certainly not reckless at micro level and 
probably not at macro level when made.
These results - which in some aspects repeat on a larger scale the 1980’s Southern Cone and 
1995 Tequila crises - strongly suggest unlimited, unregulated and to large extent unknown 
until ex post short term capital account flows are both economically, socially and politically 
destabilising and damaging. This is neither a general argument against international 
exchange liberalisation - trade flow results can at times be damaging but not in the same ways 
or to the same extent and nobody seriously proposes totally liberalised migration of labour. 
Capital flows - or at least short term capital flows - are arguable distinctly different, a case 
mode by perfectly orthodox free traders like Jagdish Bhagwati.
Nor is this argument based on the contention either that all or all short term international 
capital flows are damaging. It is simply that unlimited, unreserved, unregulated, at the time 
unknown short term flows can be damaging. In the analogous case of domestic deposit 
taking financial institutions is conventional wisdom. There are several reasons no parallel 
conventional wisdom has evolved in respect of territorial (national or currency area) external 
liability provisioning, prudential regulation and reporting:
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1. the mid 1990’s flow levels (absolutely, relative to trade and relative to total investment are 
totally disproportionate to those of the 1980’s - let alone any previous decade - and in 
country coverage are also much wider than the early 1990’s;
2. the diffusion of lenders and borrowers is much greater. Up to the late 1980’s - beyond 
the OECD group the bulk of external debt at risk (and of the burden on economies at risk 
from external debt) was sovereign or para sovereign (state guaranteed state enterprise) or 
private bank debt ’nationalised’when at risk of default. Whatever else this structure did, it 
simplified monitoring and negotiating. The last category - ’nationalised’ when at risk - 
was basically the external debt of domestic financial institutions (especially banks) 
deemed too large or too crucial to allow to fail. Arguably these were dominant in the 
’tequila crisis’ and played a large role in other instances e.g. the earlier Southern Cone 
implosion (especially in the Chicago Cowboys’ Chile) and later in the late and post 
M arcos Philippine debt overhang. By the mid 1990’s substantial proportions of short 
term (as well as longer term) external debt was, in some Southern economies directly 
raised by non-bank domestic enterprises. Such debt had not posed significant 
problems before because few if any South enterprises could raise substantial sums 
externally except through a domestic bank or with the guarantee of a major Northern 
enterprise (usually a parent).
3. Exchange controls on capital account had largely been oriented to limiting outflows 
(including overseas investment as much as repatriation of external borrowing of foreign 
investment) with very little attention to managing inflows (rarely a perceived problem). 
They had gradually eroded in the North with final dismantling (albeit from rather limited 
coverage) in the 1980’s as the end of a 30 year process, Southern liberalisation had - with 
a handful of exceptions - been much more recent (largely 1990’s), therefore the more 
rapid than in the North and apparently more on uniform acceptance of the "Washington 
Consensus" than of any contextual analysis of what to remove, how fast, in what order 
and with which (if any) retentions, substitutions or safeguards. This may in part have 
been because 1930’s-1980’s exchange controls had taken the form of across the board 
prohibitions with limited politically or administratively alterable classes of exceptions and 
non-transparent politically or bureaucratically determined exceptions with very little 
attempt to make use of, relate to, or to regulate rather than to block, market forces. This 
is not the only possible form of exchange controls, but it was the ubiquitous face of
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existing ones-partly because most were adopted under pressure to control actual or 
imminent massive outflows. This anti market image was compounded by the interaction 
of capital account exchange invisible import/foreign travel and currency controls.
Two aspects of the present crises appear to have been subject to inadequate or unbalanced
analysis:
1. there has been a dominant perception - by no means a universal one vide Chile - that the 
basic problem is keeping short term financial capital in a country once it has arrived (i.e. 
limiting outflows) with inadequate attention to analysis of the harm - as well as future 
vulnerability to volatility - caused by very large inflows. This is in medical terms 
concentration on cure with limited attention to preventative (inflow reserving/prudential 
regulation) or environmental (general financial institutional structure) aspects.
"Prevention is better than cure" has not been an axium much honoured in the 1930/1980’s 
exchange control or 1990’s post exchange control eras;
2. linked to severe over-emphasis on ’speculative’ capital, in particular hedge funds and their 
perceived personification Mr. George Soros. Most short term footloose financial capital 
movements are not ’speculative’nor are those making them following Monte Carlo 
strategies. Interest rate/exchange fluctuation arbitrage, risk limitation (the rationale of 
short term loans even when the underlying investment/cause of borrowing is medium to 
long term and collective non rollover will clearly - ex ante as well as ex post - precipitate 
a crisis) and avoiding doing worse than comparators are their hallmarks. These appear to 
be combined with a certain naivete on the inswing and a lemming pattern (running in a 
pack for ’safety’ even when that ensures falling into a chasm) on the outrush. Hedge 
funds (including proprietary sections of investment banks) do take positions which are 
known to have substantial risk and to offer substantial payoffs - but are much smaller and 
later operators. Their role can be overstated - as in Hong Kong they can create rigged 
markets but usually they pounce when they believe stock or currency prices are 
unsustainably out of line with fundamentals. Their pronouncements and believed changes 
in their positions can panic the lemmings, e.g. Soros’ declamation on the need for Russian 
devaluation and a currency board, but usually only once fundamentals are so shaky that 
there is already a financial avalanche waiting for even a minor shock. Omniscient they 
are not - the Soros’ letter apparently triggered a $1,000 million plus loss for his financial 
vehicles. The LTCM case suggests that their main threat is to Northern Financial
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institutions and certainly raises doubts as to the complex risk calculator and layoff 
practices o f at least some multinational investment banks, let alone of the LTCM model 
which was simplistic to the point of naive, was not adjusted despite 1997 result warnings 
of econom ic variable movement outside historic parameters and (perhaps most tellingly) 
in its 1995-1996 high noon delivered by 50 to 100 to 1 leveraging about the same return 
to equity owners as a Wall Street Index Fund!
In looking at the current and emerging crises and the possible role of preventative, proactive 
and responsive (in that order of potential payoff) reserving and regulation ("neo-exchange 
control"?) deserves priority analysis subject to three caveats:
1. significantly overvalued exchange rates persisted in for an extended period do build up 
forces which are almost impossible to manage when devaluation is accepted (or even 
deliberately initiated);
2. financial institution (and other enterprise) prudential regulation and reserving is
broader than that for short term external financial liabilities (or for that matter assets) as 
are financial and other enterprise transparency requirements:
3. overinvestm ent/m isallocated investment/bubble markets are not caused - so much as 
facilitated and exaggerated - by short (or for that matter long) term external finance 
inflows.
In each case the short external flows are likely to be a substantial part both of the problem 
and o f the answ er but by no means the whole of it. Japan, for example, demonstrates that 
asset price bubbles leading to financial system debilitation and prudential (at micro level) 
consum ption/investm ent reduction can lead to a recession by implosion even if the current 
account is substantially in surplus and Russia's 1994-1998 road to ruin turned - at macro 
econom ic level at least - on a Ponzi type financing of a domestic fiscal deficit and a massive 
outflow of (prudential?) capital temporarily 'validated' by increasing short term/sky high 
interest rate short term financial capital inflows. This pattern is quite unlike that of the Asian 
reverse miracle econom ies and is also less avertible by prudential inflow reserving/regulation.
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Further - as the evident differences among Korea, Russia, Brazil or, indeed, 
Korea/Indonesia/Philippines - suggest there are both general principles to be analysed and 
general policy guidelines to be sought and contextual settings to be taken into account. In 
that respect various sets of terms need both clarification and differentiation:
a. contagion/transmission. Presumably contagion means either application of 
aversion/withdrawal to genuinely similar economies with similar external flow and 
balance patterns or/and their (mis)application to dissimilar economies. If that is so 
Thailand to Indonesia to Korea to Malaysia and in a less pronounced form to the 
Philippines is ’valid’contagion and to Brazil/Argentina arguably ’misplaced’contagion;
b. transmission - differentiated from contagion - should mean the impact of initial crisis 
economies on others. China, for example, is suffering from transmission of ’reverse 
m iracle’ economy shocks more than from contagion. That is also the case for Hong Kong 
and Singapore. European and Northern American recessionary and asset valuation 
pressures are primarily/overwhelmingly transmission (to date. Stock market meltdowns 
would in practice have a high misplaced contagion component).
Russia is in practice partly contagion. Its crisis is, however, primarily because its 
fundamentals were far less sound and its external riows and balances were far less sustainable 
(and far more evidently unsustainable) than those of - say - Thailand. Indeed the logical 
question is not why George Soros’ pronunicamento on reform catalysed a crisis but why there 
had not been one 18 months, or at least a year (parallel to the moulting of the tigers) earlier. 
The only apparent reasons are faith (against evidence and logic) that honest liberalisers could 
put the fiscal imbalance right and transform primitive accumulation and asset export of a 
peculiarly rapacious and non-productive (in real macro economic terms) type into a less non 
creatively destructive form of capitalism and do it fast or that the "Indonesia with nukes" 
perception guaranteed endless and unlimited G7 bailouts.
Overinvestment, misallocation o f investment, non-transparency, cronyism, corruption 
and tilted playing fields are another set of terms used both loosely and in sloppily 
overlapping ways. The first does have a real relevance to the property and financial bubbles 
of Thailand, Malaysia, Korea and (probably) Indonesia as well as to their gross 
overexpansion of capacity in - notably - chips, other electronics, automobiles and steel. It 
probably has less cutting edge vis a vis Brazil, Argentina, Philippines or Singapore and next
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to none for Russia. Misallocation is a fact but the term seems to be being used either to 
attack government policies intended to pick winners or to imply favouritism/corruption. As 
to the former, the irony is that gross overinvestment and picking losers seems to have risen 
rapidly in Korea precisely as targeting winners was liberalised (if that is the word) to the 
chaebol in the 1990’s! The ’new’ 1997/8 state policy of encouraging chaebol to concentrate 
on a few core lines and to exchange peripheral holdings with other chaebol is arguably a 
reversion to the historic line of picking two to four "national champions" for which to provide 
an enabling climate in order to achieve economies of scale and focused attention/expertise 
consistent with at least some domestic competition. It was the chaebol, not the state, who 
rushed into each others’ back yards and built up incredibly high debt/equity ratios and rates of 
capacity expansion relative to plausible projections of domestic plus foreign demand. In the 
latter usage misallocation is a rather opacity building choice of term.
Non transparency again has two aspects - lack of regularly collected, standardised and 
timeously published data and hiding corruption or favouritism. Doubtless the second is 
helped by the first but it is not helpful to encompass both by one term nor to imply that the 
only (or even the basic) purpose of transparency is to hinder fraud. "Cronyism" has become 
a new coverall term for nepotism, overlooked (in either or both meanings of that word) fraud, 
selection of "national champions", "old boy networks" (in practice only ’old g irl’in cases of 
nepotism) and defective regulation e.g. "first come, first served" even when the second cover 
offered a better bargain. Tilted (presumptively the opposite of level) playing fields is used 
similarly. Again differentiation is likely to be important. Any non-transparent, relatively 
discretionary (even with guidelines) policy/praxis model is likely to accrete corruption over 
time, w hether local council contracting in the UK or priority product champion picking in 
Korea. But policy corroded by corruption has not necessarily the same impact as political 
contributions to secure preliminary access nor compulsory crony (in a stricter sense) partners 
unlinked to any broader policy frame. The value of avoiding misplaced coyness about 
malpractice - calling a spade a spade - is unlikely to be well serving by conflating 
malpractice, mistakes and mistaken policies - resulting in calling everything from a tea spoon 
to a grab line excavator a spade.
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PR O B L E M S O F R ISIN G  TID ES
Capital inflows have rarely been perceived by orthodox economists as causing serious 
structural or institutional problems. (External buy up of a territorial economy is a perceived 
and discussed risk but for structuralists not liberalisers.) This probably turns on two historic 
facts:
1. short term capital flows were until the 1980’s largely closely linked to trade finance or to 
parent company finance of subsidiary working capital needs;
2. the dominant form of investment was foreign direct investment was foreign direct 
investment in enterprise equity and medium to long term loans;
3. with a few exceptions, net private capital flows to poor countries before the mid 1970’s 
were relatively small until the 1970’s especially so relative to overall major financial 
enterprise resources;
4. government to government sovereign debt posed (or was perceived as posing) few 
problems because it was expected to be rolled over/replaced by new until the economy 
took off and to be used in building up infrastructure. Bank to government sovereign 
lending was perceived as problematic but only in the context of joint borrower-lender 
imprudence and - on the basis of 1970’s LA debt crisis management - was thought to be 
manageable, ex post.
Some warnings as to the risk of future debt service profiles and the danger of state (or from 
the late 1970’s) or 1980’s use of high interest, short term borrowing to avoid more sustainable 
external or fiscal account imbalance were made. However, these were seen as risks of poor 
debt management or general fiscal imprudence not of international financial flows per se. 
Investment beyond levels at which returns justified it was occasionally posed as a macro 
problem but almost only in respect to bilateral and IFI flows not private sector ones.
In the 1990’s rather more basic and readily evident distortions have resulted from massive 
and dominantly private sector short term (primarily inter bank loans and credits, though 
secondarily short term government paper and in some cases foreign currency denominated 
bank accounts, non financial enterprise short borrowing for long investment and portfolio 
investment). Almost any country or internationally known bank could secure large sums of
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30 to 180 day funding so long as its exchange rate appeared stable or subject to low risk of 
sudden falls (often as a direct result of the inflow!) and the spread over the lenders’ home 
rates was deemed adequate to cover a risk premium. For example, with home deposit and 
treasury bill rates of 0% to 5% Taiwanese and Japanese sources in the mid 1990’s found 8% 
to 12% rates in the Philippines and a currency de facto  moving with the USA$ (adding 
principal appreciation after mid 1995 for Japanese lenders) highly attractive. At the other end 
of the scale Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania in peak borrowing years sold net treasury 
obligations of up to 50% of export value but at interest rates often over 50% and sometimes 
up to 150% tax free (not perhaps the most sustainable route to closing fiscal or trade gaps 
even though endorsed at the time by the IMF in each case and ’effective’in achieving nominal 
as well as real appreciation against the USA$ despite domestic inflation rates largely in the 
10% to 25% range). The largest extreme case was that of Russia which ran up perhaps $75- 
100,000 million ruble denominated, externally held treasury paper and interbank credits as an 
alternative to collecting taxes and a means to facilitating extemalisation of assets (not 
necessarily, albeit in large part, capital flight) by the new privatised economic elite.
In retrospect (and logically in large part in prospect as well) the disadvantages of these levels 
of flows and of the interest and exchange rate strategy and tactic used to ’achieve’ them - 
especially when short term and largely unrelated to viable investment projects/programmes 
capable of generating funds and transferring foreign exchange to meet them - are multiple:
1. sustaining or aggravating overvaluation. To the extent that the inflow (short or long) 
plugged external deficits, they tended to stabilise the nominal exchange rate and to the 
extent inflows exceeded the previous gap plus flow generated (e.g. additional investment 
and additional em ployee related) imports they tended to push it up. As most flows 
recipients had inflation well above USA - Western Europe levels, even stabilising the 
nominal rate meant increasing overvaluation . The cases in which the nominal rate did 
not rise tended to be these in which either fiscal deficits or domestic capital 
extem alisation (whether for asset diversification, new investment or precautionary 
reasons) ate up much of the inflow. Korea - Thailand - Singapore - Malaysia - 
Philippines did not revalue significantly nominally (as opposed to up to 50% in real 
terms) both because of substantial recorded and unrecorded investment outflows (over 
1994-1997 up to $25,000 million unrecorded for Korea - Thailand - Malaysia - Singapore 
- Philippines - Indonesia according to the IM F which, however, wrongly treats
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unrecorded as synonymous with "flight") and deliberate Central Bank attempts to avert or 
reverse nominal appreciation by market interventios which substantially increased their 
external reserves. (They had no strategy of sucking in short term external flows to raise 
CB reserves; Brazil in 1997-98 did.) Only Indonesia attempted - with considerable 
success from the late 1980’s to mid 1997 - to maintain a stable real exchange rates by 
nudging the market down by a series of small interventions (usually totalling 6% to 9% a 
year) to offset domestic excess inflation. This did not deter foreign resource inflows but 
added a projected devaluation premium, e.g. if the going annual rate for interbank credits 
or treasury bills denominated in pesos to the Philippines was 12% to 15% it would tend to 
be 20% to 25% in rupiah for Indonesia.
2. Raising domestic interest rates, especially in savings short countries and those funding 
large fiscal deficits via short term/externally held paper. In extreme cases - e.g. East 
African ones - one had the curious policy posture of pushing for 25% to 30% nominal 
prime enterprise lending rates (5% to 10% real) while paying two to five times as much 
on Treasury paper. In other cases the driving force at times was domestic monetary 
policy set rates which did suck in footloose, rate/risk arbitraging financial capital (e.g. 
South Africa, Philippines). In the cases of high domestic savings/high investment/high 
capital gross outflow cases (e.g. Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Korea) the domestic 
interest rate impact is less clear and may on balance have been to lower them marginally 
by market flooding. In these cases - except Singapore - banking institutional patterns 
meant that competition to loan primarily took the form of increased acceptable 
debt/equity ratios and less creditworthiness assessment in general, not in lower interest 
rates.
The impact on medium (3 to 5 year) and long (over five year) loans or securities is less 
clear partly because in most cases, except for sovereign debt, these are small relative to 
short are non-transparent and are traded - if at all - in narrow, shallow markets. In 
principle given the limited domestic long term investment loan base - even in countries 
with very high domestic savings rates - the external flows (including short to the extent 
they spilled over to long) should have reduced interest rates. In practice, at least in Asia, 
they seem to have increased flows at interest rates similar (to the extent known) to annual 
average short rates i.e. a flat or inverted maturity/interest rate profile. They may have 
encouraged the beginning of domestic bond markets in the large LA and SEA economies
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albeit, especially in the latter, these were as of 1997 limited, fragmented and usually 
focused on a few finance companies, investment banks and/or project or joint venture co­
shareholders.
3. Massive inflows tended to create bubbles in two senses - especially in countries with 
high domestic savings, fiscal position of recurrent account fiscal and balance of payments 
surplus and moderate (5% to 10%) inflation. Domestically the bubbles were in asset 
prices - prim arily buildings (commercial, upper and middle income residential), land and 
stocks. These bubble effects were distinctly uneven with Thailand, Malaysia, South 
Korea and Indonesia the most severely impacted (looking at the current crisis itself, albeit 
Japan’s weak real economy and desperately fragile financial institutions do flow in large 
part form its 1980’s bubble. That was arguably triggered by excess capital availability but 
domestic savings fed and with very low nominal and real interest rates). The Russian and 
Latin American cases in the late 1990’s - like that of the Philippines - do not appear to be 
significantly asset price bubble influenced. Externally a parallel bubble phenomenon 
interacted - high interest rates sustaining nominal exchange rates with asset bubble prices 
making projects, credit and macro economic growth risks as well as exchange rate risks 
low created a bubble in respect to term bank line of credit, sovereign short term paper and 
stock market portfolio investment which interacted to blow up the domestic bubbles 
further.
4. Investm ent viability/due diligence investigation and allocation patters were worsened 
when inflows resulted in excess availability of capital (South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, 
Indonesia) or propping up blatantly unsustainable imbalances (Russia) though 
probably less so where they supplemented low (5% to 10%) or moderate (10% to 20%) 
domestic savings rates. The high supply of lendable resources encouraged banks to lend 
(foreign to domestic banks and secondarily other enterprises, domestic banks to domestic 
enterprises) and to compete by lowering quality standards and raising accepted 
debt/equity ratios rather than on price. With high growth and asset price inflation 
enterprises were encouraged both to invest in riskier projects (including ones whose 
viability turned on very high export and/or domestic demand growth including and 
dependent on but not limited to continued property booms). It also contributed to 
accepting or seeking very high leveraging even though logically the riskier the project the 
lower the prudent leveraging. The massive chip, steel and automobile capacity expansion
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- by no means only in Korea - are notable examples whose viability depended on 
increasing shares of global sales with limited price cutting. The stability of nominal 
exchange rates - and in many cases the belief in easy, massive export expansion - reduced 
evaluation of (and hedging against) the risks of assuming foreign exchange denominated 
obligations;
5. Transparency - indeed ability to know levels and natures of future foreign exchange 
liabilities - was eroded. The increase in the number of direct external borrowers, the 
shortening of the credit profile and the multiplication of types of obligations (including 
forward forex transactions, and to a lesser degree derivations more generally) had this 
effect quite independent of any desire to conceal. The 1980’s debt crises had improved 
consolidated sovereign debt data preparation (but not forward selling by central banks 
which was then relatively minor but in 1997 had eaten up 90% of the Bank of Thailand’s 
’useable reserves by the time the July crisis exploded) and to a degree major interbank 
loans and credits. Very little was in fact achieved in respect to short term non bank 
external borrowing (assumed to be dominantly trade finance and - even though this was 
demonstrably doubtful - unlikely to change on a large scale rapidly enough to be a key 
crisis component) or even long term (relatively rare in the 1980’s). Further how to handle 
"off balance sheet'Vcontingent liabilities e.g. foreign portfolio (as opposed to direct) 
investment and derivatives (where face value of underlying instruments would be a 
massive overstatement but - as recent northern hedge fund/investment bank experience 
demonstrates - historic models of risk tend grievously to underestimate);
6. Vulnerability to rapid, massive payments crises increased because of the short debt 
profile and rising ratios to foreign exchange earnings of debt and of interest and - when 
short term is dominant (almost all case except probably Argentina) - especially short term 
repayment obligations in case of non-renewal/non replacement;
7. This vulnerability was reinforced by the - apparently virtually unrecognised fact - that a 
payments crisis threatening the stability (or in the case of Indonesia stable downward 
float trajectory) of the exchange rate was likely to lead to a precipitate exchange rate 
fall overshooting (on the downside) the pre crisis ’equilibrium’ rate;
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8. And financial institution vulnerability was raised both by the reality that in a crisis 
interbank credits would be reduced or withdrawn (as documented ex post by the IMF), the 
exchange rate would fall (entailing significant losses) and many domestic borrowers 
would be afflicted by asset bubble bursts, falsified domestic and external demand growth 
projections and by overall bank attempts to limit/withdrawn credit to improve their 
balance sheets resulting in rapidly rising bad loan’ ratios. Because bankruptcy of a 
banking system is likely to result both in meltdown of the real economy and flare-up to 
violence of domestic depositors bank vulnerability virtually forces domestic 
government supportive action to a degree and an extent bankruptcy of non-financial and 
non-deposit taking financial enterprises does not.
9. The link if any between external financial inflows and cronyism/corruption is not 
clear. Up to some levels of cost and predictability external investors (including bank 
lenders) usually treat corruption as a cost rather than as an absolute barrier to investment. 
Similarly cronyism in the sense of requisite domestic partners (or ’partners’) is evaluated 
in terms of probable return ranges including the costs/benefits from the partners. That is 
true whatever the level of capital inflows (or outflows). Beyond some level perceived 
growth in level and perceived declines in predictability of cronyism/corruption - or any 
other costs/ risks - can build up to a reversal of Bows - arguably relevant to the Russia 
case. Also financial inflows do mask - for a time - structural institutional problems so 
may delay reforms and allow underlying problems to worsen.
The problems cited arise primarily from short term/footloose financial capital flows. The 
most important reason is that these flows are the largest and the most unstable. Within the 
short term category, interbank loans and lines of credit plus forward transactions are 
dominant in most cases. Other components of importance in some cases are domestic 
currency sovereign debt (treasury bills) and hard currency denominated bank deposits as well 
as portfolio investment in equities not constituting a strategic stake nor linked to direct 
foreign investment. Second, within a frame of free capital account transfers, these are the 
flows which can reverse rapidly and to outflow levels very large in respect to official and 
financial system external resources. Third, the intra bank (or at least bank routed) flows - 
including forward transactions and external currency denominated deposits - and the 
domestic currency denominated, externally owned hort term government obligations directly 
involve the financial sector and through it the whole real economy in ways different from
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loans due from a non financial enterprise whose bankruptcy and take-over by a new 
proprietor will rarely have multiplier macro impacts analogous to failure of major banks or to 
state default. (Passing on exchange risk on and risk of early withdrawal of intrabank credit 
based loans to domestic borrowers does not solve this problem as they are most unlikely to be 
able to pay at once or, in many cases, in full leaving the bank to face at least the initial 
shocks.)
One factor which appears general to most 1997-1998 external capital flow reversals leading 
to crises has received little attention in this context. It is, however, a well known one - terms 
of trade deterioration. Hydrocarbons, metals, tropical agricultural products, chips and steel 
have all recorded massive price falls since early 1997. One or more is significant in the 
external transactions of each of the Asian crisis economies, of South Africa, of Russia, of 
Venezuela and of Ecuador as well as of the contagion imperilled economies of Brazil and 
Argentina. The extent to which this, loss of import purchasing and debt service covering 
power (usually not of exports in the physical quantity sense) directly or indirectly contributed 
to the build-up of negative consciousness culminating in sudden, massive net outflows is 
unclear - logically, it should have played some especially with adjustment of exchange rates 
largely blocked whether by basic policy, levels of capital inflow or fear that devaluation 
while positive for the current account balance would trigger serious capital account reversals.
SHADOW S OF THE KREDIT ANSTALT -  REALITIES OF FINANCIAL 
GLOBALISATION
Globalisation of financial markets is real. There is a direct set of roads from the July 1997 
day the baht crashed and burnt in Bangkok to the September 1998 day LTCM stood at the 
door of implosion in Connecticut (or cyberspace?) and both the Fed and the multinational 
financial "Masters of the Universe" contemplated vistas of 1929 revisited (or a slightly 
premature M illennium Meltdown). Transmission contagion, lemming effects, even cronyism 
had travelled (presumably First Class) from Bangkok and Jakarta to Seoul and -  via Moscow 
-  come home to Zurich, Frankfurt, London and, especially, New York. While the immediate 
response may seem to be in terms of chaos theory -the  flapping butterfly in New York 
triggering a typhoon in the South China Sea -  that is arguably a matter of lack of 
transparency and of analysis. The global market logic and steps are clear enough looking 
back and could, to a much greater extent than they were, have been identified and limited by
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1995 at the latest. In that sense the loss of a nail-horshoe -  horse -  battle -  king - kingdom 
sequence is more aposite.
The most serious Northern impact -  ‘flight to quality’ -  is on the borderline between 
transmission and contagion. Experience with over expansion of lending pre lending without 
micro due vigilance and/or with no vulnerability testing for macro parametric projection 
changes logically leads to tightening up but not to a full scale credit crunch. But if the 
tightening reveals -  or is ‘seen’ to reveal (whether validly or not -  serious previously 
unrealised northern systemic or near systemic risks the lemming effect can take over and 
result in a cumulative credit crunch. The LTCM (short term derivative mismanagement) case 
is both the symbol and the largest example (to date) and its management by the Fed and the 
main multinational investment banks an indication both of persistent weaknesses and of 
differences from 1929. LTCM  apparently was leveraged up to 250 to 1 at least 25 to 50 to 1 
by borrowing and again 5 to 10 to 1 by dealing in derivatives or in other securities on margin. 
That is not -  and should have been seen not to be -  prudent for either the investors or the 
lenders. UBS pre investment study noted 250 times leverage contrasted with a UBS ceiling 
guideline of 30 - but recommended the investment. Further LTCM was a black box to 
lenders and to most investors -  no more transparent than a ruling family linked Indonesian 
joint venture (probably less). Finally its macro parametric projection model was historically 
based (necessarily) with in vulnerability, sensitivity or early warning analysis as to changes 
on those parameters (even though 1997 outturn gave a clear, unboxed warning something was 
amiss). W ith total equity and loans of perhaps $100,000 million and underlying security face 
value exceeding $1,000,000 million behind its derivatives and other margin transactions it 
was so large its failure could have led to a Northern banking meltdown and would have led to 
a financial sector meltdown on northern stock exchanges. Without a reconstruction a 
contagion impact on hedge funds in general (a very disparate group) and ones with strategies 
like LTC M ’s in particular would have been inevitable. This is a result of "flight to quality" 
transmission from the South even though LTCM itself was only trivially involved in Asia and 
only m arginally in Russia -  its fatal flaw lay in projecting on the basis of -  e.g. -  past 
maximum interest rate spreads between Southern European and USA Treasury Paper which 
broke down in the face of "flight to quality".
The natural result of growing realisation of LTCM vulnerability would have been a further 
"flight to quality" effort -  i.e. calling in loans to LTCM. A few institutions, e.g. UBS, would
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have tried to launch a lifeboat because they were so deeply concerned (and perhaps been 
sucked down as LTCM sank?) and a few e.g. Barclays, Merrill-Lynch might have trusted in 
their collateral and sought to stabilise. But most would have tried to pull out.
The Fed did not muse on moral hazard, engage in multi week analysis or negotiation or avoid 
market intervention. Analogous to Hong K ong’s Monetary Authority (if in a different 
context) and unlike the IMF it moved rapidly and massively with full secrecy before the 
event and relatively full disclosure at it. The largest and most involved investment banks 
(globally not only in the USA) were mobilised to refinance equity (90% wiping out the initial 
owners and thus greatly weakening the moral hazard critique). They and a second tier were 
lined up to provide/ensure lines of credit. Granted no public funds were used, the hand was 
the quite visible hand of the Fed -  Alan Greenspan knows systemic and lemming effect risks 
when he sees them. LTCM was not to be allowed to be the new Kredit Anstalt on the Fed's 
watch for lack of action. Having acted to contain the damage, the Fed (and SEC) then moved 
on to push for new disclosure and leveraging rules in respect to hedge funds -  or at least 
banks lending to them -  in a context in which the banks are presumably more than usually 
willing (or even eager?) to explore such prudential regulation/pre crisis intervention for the 
future. The Fed also began a process of signalling against rapid credit contraction by shabing 
(not panic slashing) a key lending rate and stating (elliptically as usual) more would follow if 
needed to stabilise the credit provision system.
A side point is that this case raises doubts as to the virtues of a monistic focus for a central 
bank on national inflation control. For the Bank of England to have done what the Fed did 
with the B of E ’s current mandate would arguably have been improper (and thus even if 
agreed after dialogue probably too late). The propto ECB (and existing Bundesbank) are 
constrained (or at least arguably constrained) and certainly monistically focussed in the same 
way. This is not an argument either about accountability or independence -  the Fed’s 
independence meant it could act virtually instantly (doubtless keeping the US Treasury in the 
picture) and its accountability meant that it and selected financed institutions mobilised by it 
testified publicly and analytically to the US Congress within a week. It is an argument that 
(perhaps fau te  de mieux) a Central Bank must have multiple duties/goals -  price stability, 
external account sustainability, financial system viability and overall macro 
output/employment level health — and take reasoned judgements when real or potential 
conflicts arise among them. One goal/one set of instruments/one institution may in principle
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be optimal, but at present there are no realistic alternatives to Central Bank involvement in 
financial system viability and external balance sustainability pursuit nor to very close 
collaboration with Treasuries on output/employment level health in ways which do require it 
to take risks/make tradeoffs on the price stability goal.
Another Southern echo in the LTCM case is cronyism. "Too big to fail" -  more accurately 
too big to be allowed to fail because of systemic impact -  can be misused as a cover for 
bailing out "cronies" and often does raise moral hazard issues. LTCM ’s guiding lights were 
part of the multinational financial elite; major institutions and their senior officers were 
deeply at risk; the bailout negotiations were among colleagues and acquaintances -  
pejoratively cronies. LTCM ’s initial investors/operators are -  on the face of it -  only 90% 
wiped out when without the bailout they would have lost 100% of their LTCM stake and in 
several cases been bankrupted. UBS justified its proposed investment by arguing 30% of 
investment was by eight strategic financial institutions, a majority state owned, with windows 
to see structural changes in advance. One was the Italian foreign exchange stabilisation fund 
whose interest in financing an enterprise committed to pushing the Italian sovereign debt 
interest rate spread above the comparable German and USA rates is easy enough to see but 
not easy to regard as prudent investment on its part nor possibly to regard as conflict of 
interest free. But, this is arguably to scan knotholes, not even trees, much less the forest. The 
mistakes of analysis and judgem ent were appalling and were among colleagues, but to allow 
them to affect only those who made them was not possible. LTCM’s implosion would have 
had systemic consequences, it could have been the Kredit Anstalt 50 years on (with Zurich's 
largest gnome - UBS - probably next in line) and waiting to see would have been a Monte 
Carlo option trem endously more expensive and possibly impossible to reverse once LTCM 
had collapsed. Systemic risk had to be tackled rapidly and massively even if the mistake 
makers did (as at top levels of globalised sectors they usually do) have close prior working 
relationships. A 90% penalty for error is not so low as to justify claims moral hazard was 
ignored and the Italian state entity investment issues can be pursued now with markets - 
perhaps - restabilised better than in the furnace of a lire meltdown.
The LTCM  case highlights that while the main body of this paper focuses on Southern 
manifestations and measures, the principle arguments and lines of action do have Northern 
relevance and analogues. Globalisation exists and will not go away. Markets do overshoot, 
Lemming effects are real. Financial destruction via the market does not affect only the
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imprudent, is not always creative nor self correcting and can be socially, politically and real 
economy (output and employment) disastrous to the point of unsustainability.
In the North the problems of overborrowing (too high short term risk and return arbitraging 
short term capital provision) relates to sectors and to types o f financial institutions (treating 
Southern economies as sectors) while the problem of overlending (and then overloosing) has 
a much higher profile than in the South. But in the South imprudent lending by domestic 
banks is as central as and directly linked to overborrowing from external while the bio and 
info technology Northern bubbles (involving equity, portfolio and long term credit as well as 
short term) are in retrospect analogous to the Bangkok property bubble to bust and the LTCM 
black box to black hole scenarios. Similarly how to act preventatively, proactively and in 
crisis containment mode necessarily varies, but the Fed’s LTCM intervention the HKMA 
stock market intervention (intriguingly focussed not only on the vulnerable financial and 
property sectors but within them on the largest and highest quality enterprises) are basically 
similar proactive operations. Regulating hedge funds via requiring lending banks to limit 
overall leveraging (basically a Northern preventative measure) would be similar to requiring 
banks to hold -  say -  25% prime hard currency short term asset reserves against external 
currency denominated deposits (basically a Southern preventative measure).
RESERVING, REGULATING, REPORTING: PRUDENTIAL PREVENTION
The priority given to preventative action is not based on any premise that proactive and 
(reactive) crisis containment measures can be rendered unnecessary always and everywhere, 
let alone that immediate tasks are basically preventative rather than present crisis 
containment. The reasoning is rather different:
a. large inflows of external funds, and especially of footloose short term finance which is 
either risk avoiding or speculative swing maximising cause problems during inflow and 
therefore should be managed then;
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b. because massive short term external indebtedness massively increases vulnerability 
exposure to it needs to be limited and safeguarded by prudential limits and reserve 
requirements before uncontrolled excess liquid finance comes in (analogous to 
bulkheading and stabilisation requirements for ships to limit capsizes from massive 
internal tidal waves as in the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster);
c. prevention therefore can limit both levels of risk and vulnerability to shocks in a way 
even proactive semi ex post measures cannot;
d. unless crisis containment is to become a repetitive series of remarkably similar but ever 
larger and more desperate ’one o f f  (in hope if not reality) measures a clear structure of 
prevention - proaction - and crisis containment should inform crisis containment
measures;
e. indeed while there never is a perfect time to institute reserving, regulation and reporting 
the middle and late phases of crisis containment are quite possibly the least problematic 
periods for phasing them in because confidence has been - at least provisionally - been 
restored, most skeletons are already out of closets and resources for building up 
provisioning are likely to be least hard to mobilise.
The focus on reserving/provisioning, prudential regulation and reporting is partly analytical 
and partly political. It is the approach which is most market related. Such measures manage 
and set param eters for markets rather than blocking them and leave basic discretion to 
enterprise managers in a way traditional exchange controls do not. Similarly they are part 
and parcel o f conventional wisdom in Northern financial actors - degrees and details not 
existence are the issues in real world debates. Therefore arguing that Southern economies 
should act similarly that global analogues (almost certainly partial) deserve exploration and 
that reporting should be global with reserving and prudential regulation globally coordinated 
is not and cannot seriously be asserted to be inconsistent with market oriented financial 
systems. To attack such an approach root and branch is not to challenge Mao Tse Tung and 
The Bank of China but Alan Greenspan and the Fed (perfectly possible but not exactly the 
same thing!).
The focus is largely but not exclusively on short term financial flows and ratios because most 
international financial flows are short term and because the potential for rapid and
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unmanageable reversal of flows is much higher for short term lending (and derivative 
transaction) than for long term, lending let alone equity. The primary of attention given to 
banks and the secondary attention to other large domestic enterprise external borrowers is 
equally pragmatic. Banks are the largest sources and channels of inflows and - unlike, say, 
hedge funds or smaller finance and property companies borrowing from them - are relatively 
easy to identify and to require to report and to enforce prudential limits (e.g. on debt/equity 
ratios of their borrowers well below the 7 to 1 which was the average pre crisis level for the 
Korean chaibol sector).
Similarly emphasis - at least for immediate forward planning - is put on available, practicable 
instruments. In most South economies 100 banks and 200 other financial and non-financial 
enterprises account for 90% of enterprise sector external borrowing (and almost as large a 
proportion of domestic borrowing and lending). Therefore reserving, regulating and 
reporting are not inherently impracticable or so leaky as to be of little impact - albeit the mind 
boggling apparent $20,000-30,000 million first half 1998 Chinese enterprise asset 
extemalisation is a cautionary note in this regard. National capital ratio, articulated reserve 
ratio, client leverage limit and, reporting requirements are available; international ones are 
not and will not be in the short to medium run. Raising interbank and other short term 
borrowing costs by reserving (e.g. 25% or 50% held in prime external paper or in non-interest 
paying Central Bank deposit accounts) is practicable and arguably can be useful. The Tobin 
tax (on all foreign/foreign exchange transactions whether or not real and whether or not any 
actual conversion takes place) on all transactions is not available, because to be effective it 
needs to cover most major markets, and presents major definitional, assessment and 
incidence/impact estimation problems.
Articulated reserving by banks and other financial enterprises and - perhaps - by non 
financial enterprises borrowing externally against net short term (0 to 365 day) external 
liabilities is central to preventative market management neo-exchange control.
Reserving against external liabilities is needed on an articulated basis by duration of 
borrowing and by borrower. The reserving should be by the initial foreign currency borrower 
and be held in foreign exchange (or readily marketable prime hard currency paper - given 
volatility preferably demonstrated in the same currency as the borrowings). Reserves in 
domestic currency and banks’passing on the currency risk in their onward domestic loans are 
not serviceable because they do not provide instant access reserves to diminish the risk of and
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increase resilience in the face of sudden outflows. In the risk passing case they may well be 
ineffective in a crisis as the ability of domestic market oriented enterprises (unless literally 
holding take or pay contracts payable in hard currency) are highly likely to need to 
renegotiate at least the loan repayment period if the exchange rate plummets.
The two main methods of providing such reserves are deposits (at low or no interest) with the 
central Bank or by the borrower holding prime hard currency paper (basically Treasury bills 
or major - "too big to fail" - multinational bank obligations). Which is preferable is 
contextual. If reporting and regulation are rapid and effective the latter would seem more 
market and borrower responsibility friendly (and to lower risk of the CB being pressed to use 
the reverses to meet other foreign currency requirements).
A possible third option is forward hedging against external borrowing. This has rarely been 
practised by banks in most South economies nor pushed hard by their governments. So long 
as the hedge partner was a first class multinational bank (to avert the disasters when Russian 
hedge contracts blew up in the fac3s of external bank lenders), it may be prudent to allow 
banks and other financial institutions to choose between hedges and prime external assets 
(presumably on the basis of the opportunity cost of the former vs. the contract cost of the 
latter).
The main types of bank (or analogous financial institution plus insurance company) 
borrowing needing provisioning are:
a. foreign currency denominated deposits;
b. interbank loans and credits;
c. externally held - however denominated - debentures and similar securities;
d. forward foreign currency transactions;
e. other derivative obligations.
Except in the last two cases the amounts are determinate. In that pair however as the 
exchange rate will not go to infinity nor will spreads determining derivative obligation some 
type of exposure to liability determination guidelines will need to be established.
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Distinctions are also needed between short (365 day or less), medium (1 to 3 year) and long 
(over 3 year) obligations with preserving highest for short and lowest for long. When there is 
no crisis and no threatening inflow of external funding 25%, 15% and 10% ratios might 
well be adequate. For example, 25% withdrawal or non rollover of interbank loans and lines 
within a year is a crisis reaction and knowing such a level of calls can be met should ensure it 
does not occur. Contexts are relevant to precise requirements. For example Philippine dollar 
denominated deposits are near or above present external reserves but are largely held by 
Filipinos using them as safe store of value places for savings to be used to support family 
members, build houses or make small investments plus companies using them to insure 
against exchange rate risk (or current foreign exchange earnings volatility) in respect to 
future external payments. These are not very volatile types of holding so the June 1997 
Central Bank setting of a 25% external asset reserve against them appears adequate.
One reason for moderate base reserve levels is that in the proactive and (perhaps) the reactive 
stages of external capital account management/neo exchange control it is desirable to be able 
to raise reserve requirements at least on new obligations which cannot be done if initial levels 
approach 100%.
In respect to foreign currency forward contracts and to other derivatives, as noted, serious 
exposure estimation issues arise. In the former case - assuming banning leveraged 
transactions (or limiting them to 10% of unimpaired tier owe-equity-capital) - 25% to 33% of 
exposure at current exchange rates might be adequate. In the latter it is essential to have 
limits on leveraging but probably impracticable to ban it (unless a total ban on such 
transactions is intended which might be prudent for all but a handful of domestic financial 
institutions in most emerging financial market countries) because leveraging is the name of 
the game in commodity, stock exchange index and interest rate spread derivatives. Given the 
lurid light the LTCM case, throws on major multinational investment bank ability to 
understand/project such risks limiting underlying face value (not the lower apparent 
leveraged commitment) to - say - 10% of unimpaired tier are capital and reserving of 33% of 
that would appear a prudent first approximation.
In principle reserves levels should be calculated net and overall. In practice this may be 
imprudent. If external lending/lines of credit/foreign currency forward purchases are in 
currencies or to/from institutions which may be unable to deliver it is not safe to net them out. 
Possibly a list (based on international credit ratings) of approved currencies and
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institutions credit balances with whom could be netted out would be appropriate. This could 
- should to facilitate regional economic interaction - be supplemented by common regional 
reserving and regulation standards with countries/qualified enterprises (based on national 
lists?) approved for netting out purposes.
Reserving should apply to non-financial enterprises borrowing externally directly. This 
does not require as much reporting/monitoring burden as might be supposed as in most 
emerging capital market economies 100 (or even 50) enterprises will account for 90% of the 
sector’s external borrowings. The short term obligations in these cases could include 
confirmed trade letters of credit or could exclude if the commercial banks were required to 
provision their net forex liability position on such letters. Non financial domestic enterprises 
might be allowed to provision through hard currency denominated accounts with domestic 
banks because the banks would then provision those but that route should require higher 
provisioning (at least 50% when the basic rate is 25%) to limit leveraged dilution. 
Realistically these relatively large enterprises are quite capable of opening accounts 
externally with major multinational banks. Probably interest rate spreads will be low enough 
for an account o f 25% of the next 365 days obligations at - e.g. HKSB - London to be less 
costly than a $ one of 50% at - e.g. Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) - Manila.
A special problem in respect of some non-financial institution borrowers is that of off 
balance sheet potential external liabilities. These are predominately foreign currency 
borrowings by external subsidiaries or joint venture guaranteed by the parent company. The 
provisioning against such contingent liabilities depends not primarily on the face value as 
such but on the risk of the guarantee being called. For example San M iguel’s Hong Kong 
subsidiary is profitable and its debt (even if guaranteed) low risk but the same cannot be said 
of the China-Vietnam-Indonesia breweries which are at an initial entry loss making phase and 
may stay there until those three markets pick up (and/or present excess capacity is closed in 
China). If - e.g. - San M iguel’s obligations to meet cash flow subsidiary losses are 
contractual, provision against them probably should be required but again real problems of 
likely outflow estimation arise.
Provision against non-sovereign debt logically should be paralleled by provisioning against 
sovereign (including for this purpose state, regional and municipal obligations) external 
debt. Presumably determining short, medium, long term obligations is relatively easy. So 
too would be designation of the Central Bank as holder of - ring forced - provisioning
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(preferably counter-balanced by non withdrawable Treasury and local government treasury 
deposits with the CB paying interest - say - 0.5% a year below the average liquid external 
asset reserve earning rate). In these cases a more marked taper e.g. 33% - 10% - 0% might be 
prudent to give a higher incentive against government short term external borrowing. 
Certainly the greater 1998 strength of Argentina’s real vs. Brazil’s cruzeiro (despite 
significant overvaluation in both cases and a higher external reserve to GDP or trade balance 
ratio for Brazil) turns on a much shorter sovereign debt profile (including government and 
Central Bank) for Brazil.
Foreign owned domestic currency sovereign debt - which can exceed reserves when it is 
the principle channel of short term inflows and which precipitated (even though it did not 
cause) the 1998 Russian crisis - needs to be provisioned. The problem is not one of logic but 
of identification. Clear identification of ultimate owners at time of sale or transfer to a new 
holder is needed. Legitimate foreign holders should not be alarmed if the link of 
CB/Treasury external asset provisioning is made clear but the complexities of up to date 
recording if there is a substantial second hand market could be severe. Money washing 
transactions - external and domestic - will be deterred but that is logically a gain.
While a parallel recording system for domestically issued foreign owned enterprise sector
securities is desirable it is hard to see how provisioning could be required. At least during 
the preventative phase no imposed restrictions (possibly standby for proactive or reactive 
phases) would appear to be desirable. Exceptions may exist if non strategic stake holdings 
became a major proportion of market capitalisation - say over 50%? - and also large relative 
to GDP and reserves. The more relevant instruments may lie in limiting leveraging (i.e. 
margin transactions) by all holders domestic or foreign.
Foreign exchange provisioning by itself is not adequate as a complete prudential 
regulation system. A bank endangered by bad domestic loans will not be well perceived by 
the intrabank lending market nor will it be able to perform the basic role of a bank - to 
provide credit to facilitate the operation of viable "real economy" enterprises. Enforceable 
and enforced prudential guidelines and formulae are needed. One clearly stands out - 
allowable degree of leveraging by borrowers (and related requirements as to collateral).
The 7:1 net debt to equity ratio in 1997 of Korea’s chaebol and the probably not much lower 
ratios of large sectors of Thai, Malaysian and Indonesian large enterprises are both an 
irrefutable indictment of financial sector regulation and of lender prudence/risk management
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and also a major cause of their present financial sector crises. Per contra the much lower 
Philippine ratios - 1 to 1 is considered plausible, 1.5 to 1 marginal and 2 to 1 alarming for 
large non financial enterprises other than public utilities and to a degree property companies - 
say something in favour of its public regulatory and bank prudential systems and in large part 
explain its significantly less acute banking sector strains.
Presumably articulated guidelines are needed. For some types of financial institutions and 
public utilities (especially those with inflation linked take or pay contracts) up to 3:1 may be 
prudent. Elsewhere a 1.5:1 or 2:1 ceiling might be appropriate. If pre regulatory reform 
actual levels are significantly higher a phasing in would seem appropriate especially during a 
preventative phase - reducing vulnerability to and increasing resilience against future shocks 
not creating an im mediate crisis is the goal.
As with banks, special problems arise in estimating basic risk (and therefore underlying 
debt/equity ratio) in respect to forward transaction/derivative operations. However these 
are estimated, a ceiling ratio of 3:1 of total assessed liability to equity to be eligible for bank 
finance would appear prudent even if this did deter legitimate and non Monte Carlo 
enterprises. The risks to lenders of true leveraging of 50 to over 100 to 1 (cf. LTCM) are so 
high an em erging capital market regulatory system should probably err on the side of 
systemic risk limitation. In cases like Singapore and Hong Kong perhaps lists of approved 
borrowers up to 5:1 could be built up but many regulatory systems have little capacity to do 
so and more urgent tasks to undertake.
Leveraging lim itation via banks (and capital market issues - which will normally involve 
banks as managers, underwriters or trustees) is a first step. Since bank credit or bank 
involved bond issues are the main sources of borrowing it can be substantially effective by 
itself. But it needs at some point to be complemented by mirror rules for borrowing 
enterprises, perhaps with an initial cut-off level of borrowing above $1 million to limit cases 
to efficiently monitorable numbers. As with banks phasing in would be appropriate to 
solvent (and not currently badly illiquid) enterprises - strengthening not flattening is the aim.
Security transaction regulation logically would centre on margins, short sales and 
derivatives. There is, on the face of it, no reason to limit regulation to external entities as the 
volatility and systemic risk problems are not limited to their transactions. Further, since it is 
lenders, brokers and exchanges who can be regulated directly, across the board rules are
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simpler to operate whereas external entity only ones would entail checking multiple 
intermediary structures quite apart from causing clashes with Northern governments as well 
as institutions.
The maximum margin allowed on security purchase - including long (call) and short (put) 
transactions as a preventative measure should be 50%. That would reduce the risk of 
investor/financial institution bankruptcy in the face o f margin calls (on purchases, longs and 
shorts) and greatly reduce the leveraging (to 1 to 1) thus making highly speculative long or 
short operations less attractive. Long o r short - bubble prices from long speculation via calls 
is, like excessive inflows of short term external funds, to which it may be related, a problem 
in itself as well as in the vulnerability to subsequent shorting (putting).
"Naked shorts" (no contract to cover delivery of shorted security either by ownership or 
forward purchase at time of shorting) should be forbidden as should "lending" (by transfer on 
nominal purchase agreement - not so nominal in the event of shorter default as some 
investors in Malaysia have discovered) of securities by financial institutions to cover them.
Securities markets and their member traders (as well as lenders) would be the practicable 
control points. They can be required to secure data to ensure that not under 50% of the 
cost/face value of the security/derivative is paid, not borrowed. Some leakage can arise with 
foreign firms whose external borrowing cannot be checked adequately, but probably not 
enough to render the approach nugatory.
Such measures would limit the growth of securities market transactions; drastically for 
shorting and longing. That may be an acceptable price for reducing volatility, systemic 
collapse risk and scissors type external speculation against exchange rates and domestic 
securities as in Hong Kong in the third quarter of 1998. Measures like these were 
implemented in the USA in the 1930’s (in response to/to prevent the recurrence of) the 1929 
crash and were not fully phased out until at least the late 1960’s. Some are in the process of 
being introduced in Japan. If the USA viewed such measures as prudent for over 30 years 
after 1929 it is hard to argue against them in principle as preventative devices in much 
narrower, shallower, less transparent and institutionally weaker markets. Given twenty year 
past - and probable twenty year forward projection - emerging market volatility and the real 
risk of betting on crises speculation and lemming effects, a 50% downpayment level also 
appears prudent (especially as it could be reduced to 25% if greater breadth, liquidity and
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stability were to emerge and last. The USA deposit requirements were gradually reduced 
from 100% to 75% to 50% to 25% before final abolition).
Reserving, especially on doubtful loans, may in some systems be a major reform requirement 
for banks as may be equity and tier two capital (highly subordinated long term debt) to risk 
asset ratios. Here best practice - whether BIS or Fed or Hong Kong or Singapore guidelines - 
are a logical starting point for contextual adaptation and articulation. In general emerging 
capital market banks will need higher provisioning and equity/second tier capital to at risk 
assets ratios than Northern ones (and BIS standards). As a first approximation 5% reserves 
against loans plus 50% against problem (over 30 days in arrears on interest or principal) and 
75% on ’bad’ (debtor in protection from creditors, together with bankruptcy or liquidation) 
ones might be prudent as would a 10% capital (excluding problem/bad debt reserves) to risk 
weighted (e.g. 0% USA Treasury bills to 100% defaulted loans to entities in liquidation with 
few assets or similarly placed bankrupt individuals) lending.
Once required reserve/provision levels pass some threshold - perhaps 10% of gross loans 
- supervision on a case by case basis is needed to achieve orderly, timeous removal of both 
the bad or partially bad assets and the provisions against them from the balance sheet.
Letting both lie there certainly creates an impression of fragility and is likely to encourage 
vain hope nursing or waiting for something to turn up in the case of hopeless buirowers. 
However, strict, inflexible time deadlines are unlikely to be appropriate because the options 
of foreclosing on collateral, forcing bankruptcy disposal, putting in an administrator and 
manager, facilitating a reconstruction (including new equity injection but also, quite 
probably, some debt to equity conversion and possibly additional total exposure) will each be 
appropriate in some cases and each has a different time scale for loan write-off, writedown, 
return to good status so that detailed supervision is needed. Any large financial institution in 
such straits does need close monitoring to avert - or act rapidly in the case of - further 
deterioration.
There is no technical reason the preceding reserving and prudential regulation system (and 
the data to make it work) could not be built up in 2 to 5 years in most larger and middle size 
emerging market economies. Advice on structure and legal form, special training for current 
Central Bank/SEC/Treasury regulatory personnel and new domestic professional recruits and 
some initial expatriate staff are likely to be needed but neither the design, the legal, nor the
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personnel side should pose insurmountable obstacles if a genuine government priority to 
action exists.
Other aspects of regulation including on limitations on concentration of loans, on share of 
equity in total assets (or relative to bank equity), on constraining lending to bank owners and 
associates and on fraud detection and revealing to regulators are again areas in which external 
best practice can provide a starting point. They may require substantial contextual 
modification in countries in which banks (and insurance companies) are members of 
corporate families but modification should not mean waiver. For example if the insurance 
company in the Philippine Ayala Corporation group lends 10% of reserves to main Ayala 
companies and 5% on mortgages to property purchasers from Ayala (or vice versa) this may 
be prudent but were the shares 30% each it would not be. In such country and financial 
enterprise cases, there may be need for special provisions as to independent directors, 
external audit and direct transmission of audit results to regulatory authorities.
Requiring reserving (external and overall) and prudential management (including limitations 
on leveraging) both require and are facilitated by transparency. Unless data are promptly 
and accurately provided to regulators (and checked by them in cases of doubt) the system can 
neither work nor, for very long at least, be perceived as working. Unless at least macro and 
sectoral data are published promptly the system is unlikely to be fully credible. If they 
are then observation of their levels and trends will provide reinforcement to prudential (crisis 
preventative) behaviour by lenders and borrowers alike.
A major argument against disclosure has been that it would precipitate a crisis rather than 
prevent one. That is a matter of timing. Had Thailand introduced transparency in May 1997 
(including its mortgaging of up to 90% of Bank of Thailand reserves in forward transactions) 
doubtless the July crisis would have come immediately. Had it done so in May 1992 - when 
most of the excess short term inflow, the resultant domestic overleveraging, the property 
bubble and the mortgaging of B of T reserves had not yet taken place - it should have averted 
or significantly limited all of these trends. The B of T, the Treasury, lenders and - probably - 
borrowers would have behaved more prudently and the property bubble would have been 
much smaller (e.g. like the Philippine case in which the main property companies are 
reporting radically reduced profits and net cash flows but profits not losses and lower interest 
and repayment cover but still over 1). Either pre crisis or post crisis is the time for
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introduction - just before or during is in fact likely to be impracticable because of other 
needs and just before might also in the absence of earlier transparency hamper proactive 
measures.
Both reserving and prudential regulation should be transparent regionally and globally. The 
logical regional coordinators/publishers would be associations of central banks although 
regional development banks - as clearly independent institutions - are alternative publishers 
and globally the IM F (or the World Bank if it is desired to differentiate between publishable 
data and other information provided to IMF teams which financial and commercial prudence 
might suggest should remain confidential) - albeit in both cases this would require substantial 
upgrading of present guideline setting and monitoring capacity. Logically some minimum  
level o f transparency (and of prudential regulation and reserving) should be a threshold 
below which access to new/additional Fund drawings was denied or at least made 
preconditional on an agreed set of measures and a timetable for implementing them. Both the 
transparency and the potential fund ineligibility without it would deter worsening of 
structures and vulnerability via excess inflows albeit non transparency and ineligibility would 
raise the risk of precipitating a crisis if they were believed to indicate a situation worse than 
reality.
Deposit insurance is a means of reducing likelihood of and levels of mass domestic 
withdrawal surges and may make it both less likely that banks will fail and less crucial to 
’nationalise’ their net deficits if they are in danger of doing so. Guarantees of - say - 100% up 
to $10,000, o f 75% between $10,001 and $20,000, of 50% between $20,001 and $50,000 and 
of 25% thereafter up to $1,000,000 would (especially since households and enterprises will 
’diversify’ banks) reduce the panic withdrawal threat and the risk of national small savers’ 
wipe-out and resultant social unrest. That could be strengthened by two additional 
provisions:
a. bust banks will be taken over by a reconstruction, sale and liquidation agency (as
used by the USA in its savings and loan crisis) which would either pass on/sell off good 
borrower loans and parallel liabilities to sound banks at once or operate the ’good asset 
bank’contained within the bust one to avoid an interim credit crunch and to ready it for 
resale while dealing with bad assets/borrowers in a separate wing. This approach will
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normally wipe out or near wipe out former owners so is relatively immune to moral 
hazard objections;
b. repayment o f the deposit insurance agency will rank as co-first priority claims on 
assets recovered/entity sale proceeds together with tax liabilities and employee 
compensation; the balance of deposits and agency operating costs as co-second priority 
claims and all other liabilities (including interbank loans and credits even if secured) as 
co-third priority. So long as external bank lenders are not treated worse than domestic 
there is no self evident grounds for IFI or other general Northern objection.
The snag with such deposit insurance proposals is initial finance for the insuring institution 
to achieve initial credibility. If it charges 1% a year on all deposits it will take 8.1% years to 
build up a ratio of 10% reserves to all deposits (perhaps 12% to covered ones) even assuming 
no net calls at all on its resources over those 8 to 9 years. The only apparent modality would 
be to provide a Central Bank line of credit to be repaid from asset/enterprise disposals (which 
might take 3 to 5 years) and subsequent annual premiums on deposits. A possibility, at least 
for smaller and lower income economies, might be to convert IM F’s ESAF (now a rather odd 
and unsatisfactory mini IDA) to a Financial Sector Reconstruction Facility and/or to use 
World Bank financial sector loans for this purpose.
PROACTIVE RESPONSE: RESTORING SUSTAINABILITY
Proactive in the present context does not relate to action after the turning of the external 
inflow tide, but to periods when it has become unsustainably high and action is needed to 
avert (or to limit) a future outflow crisis. In general, therefore, it is desirable to focus on 
tightening up the reserving and prudential regulation instruments of the preventative period
i.e. make inflows - especially short term inflows - less attractive to lenders (buyers) and 
borrowers (joint ventures) alike. However, complementary measures and uneven increases in 
reserving and regulating measures may be appropriate if the impact of inflows is problematic 
in only a few sectors. So too may be specific - largely Central Bank or Treasury - 
interventions to lengthen external debt profile and increase liquid external reserves. In 
cases in which an outflow crisis comes to appear inevitable prior negotiation of an IMF 
Standby Agreement (in the original and literal sense) and (by the financial sector as well as 
the state) of external (governmental and bank) lines of credit is also likely to be appropriate.
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At this phase controls on outflows or moratoria - indeed official public discussion of them - 
are likely to be inappropriate because of their propensity to cause and to exacerbate tidal 
wave outflows whereas lines of credit and standbys tend to increase confidence both because 
of the funds they make available and because the fact of negotiating them suggests policy and 
practice are alert and in control.
Determining when inflows have reached unsustainable levels requires the implementation 
of the data collection and transparency requirements proposed earlier. These are needed to 
have a timeous picture on what external capital account inflows, outflows and stocks are. 
They are also im portant in facilitating both a general dampening effect on flows and use of 
Central Bank/Treasury moral suasion on financial institutions and major new financial 
corporate external borrowers.
In this phase regional and global coordination may become more important. This is 
especially so if  the conditions/dynamics threatening to build up to a crisis are widespread 
among countries in one region, but not universal so that standby pre-positioning can be 
negotiated between the external reserve/balance stronger countries of the region and those 
threatened. Howard it is also true globally - international transparency standards and 
reporting may have limited effect on euphoria during early build-up of flows, but could be 
expected to be more closely observed and reflected upon as flows built up. They could also 
form a backdrop facilitating standby arrangement negotiation by more prudent inflow 
recipients.
Regionally coordinated measures need not - usually should not - be identical. But neither 
should they relate only to direct national vulnerabilities, stage two knock on (or knock over) 
effects from the most vulnerable will be significant if intra regional economic interactions are 
substantial. For exam ple as of early 1997 Thailand, Malaysia, South Korea (less evidently) 
Indonesia were at major, imminent risk. The Philippines - at least directly - was less so 
because o f lesser inflows and less overinvestment while Hong Kong’s direct problem centred 
on its property market bubble. But Hong Kong, Singapore and - to a lesser degree - Taiwan 
were severely at risk from loss of exports to or major devaluation by afflicted economies. 
China, Japan and Australia were at risk for similar reasons and both had potential to, and 
economic self interest in, building up a standby safety net to limit intraregional trade 
(including their own exports) collapse as a result of a credit crunch.
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On reserving, provisioning and regulation higher levels not new instruments, are likely 
to be appropriate. For example 50% instead of 25% and 75% instead of 50% on specified 
types of external liabilities, or more specifically new ones (gross new, not net, to increase 
average reserving on rollovers) should help cut back on unsustainable inflows. However, 
under certain circumstances reserves required against medium and long term obligations 
might not only be increased but even decreased to enhance incentives to restructure toward a 
long term external debt profile.
In parallel debt/equity ratio limits for new credit (internal or external) might need to be 
tightened and allowable margins reduced (downpayment proportion increased) on security 
(including derivative transactions). If an outflow crisis and/or a recession were viewed as 
inevitable then - but probably not before - reserve requirements against net additions to risk 
weighted assets should be raised as at that point non-performing loans will inevitably rise.
Negotiation of Standby Agreements with the IMF in the absence of any immediate need or 
desire to draw - as the Philippines did in the second quarter of 1997 and again in 1998 - may 
have a useful prepositioning and prophylactic affect in respect to outflows. Whether they 
would cause reappraisal of levels of current lending is unclear. Negotiation - by Central 
Banks, Treasuries and financial institutions of lines of credit with Central Banks, government 
agencies and multinational banks - would have similar preposiiioning and prophylactic 
impact to IMF standbys but potentially greater tendency to reduce other levels of net 
multinational bank lending.
If an outflow crisis appears inevitable Treasuries and - to a lesser degree - central Banks and 
banks may benefit from external debt profile lengthening/reserve enhancement measures.
These would involve new medium and long term borrowing used to reduce short term 
liabilities and/or enhance reserves. Argentina and - to a minor extent - the Philippines did 
this in early 1998 but Brazil’s parallel and later borrowing to enhance reserves was itself short 
term and therefore much less effective as a subsequent external liquidity profile and external 
confidence enhancing measure.
If proactive measures do not appear to be having a significant impact on restoring net inflow 
levels to sustainable trend paths, preparation for a reactive crisis containment stage needs 
to be begun, so that measures at point can be prompt and seen to be characterised by 
prudence rather than panic - both unlikely if they have to be devised, evaluated and
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introduced unpreplanned in the teeth of a crisis. That preplanning, at least in detail, is 
probably an exception to the desirability of transparency. The transparency which is 
desirable in respect to crisis measures is globally and regionally agreed criteria to validate 
and instruments to impose temporary repayment freezes, transfer delays and moratoria with a 
view to restructuring.
During both the preventative and proactive phases the case for direct Central Bank 
intervention to alter exchange rate trends is limited. Genuine smoothing to limit 
apparently erratic fluctuations and possibly day limits of - say + or -  2Vi% (which triggered 
shutdown of wholesale - not retail currency exchange) in effective rates can be useful. In the 
case of a clear creeping overvaluation trend (or canter if the nominal rate shows signs of 
rising) there are arguments for a Central Bank policy of issuing paper partially to sterilise 
liquidity (and thus inflows) with the proceeds invested in highly liquid, low risk external 
assets (not futures contracts a la the Malaysian or, earlier, Malawian Central Banks nor hedge 
funds a la the Bank of Italy). However, continued need to follow such a policy suggests a 
need to tighten up on reserving and/or provisioning.
In respect to outward capital account exchange control, the preventative and proactive 
stages are - by definition as excess inflow is the problem - not ones in which tightening is 
appropriate. If there are pre-existing capital account exchange controls, how rapidly they 
should be attenuated is a contextual, empirical question not one of ideology. To pose major 
(and especially increased) barriers to external investment outflow does discourage external 
capital inflow, but is hardly consistent with seeking optimal (as opposed to nil or very low) 
inflows nor to facilitating their direct mobilisation by the enterprise sector rather than their 
concentration in sovereign or sovereign guaranteed debt. Similarly to bar or severely restrict 
external investment by domestic enterprises either bars them from participating effectively in 
regionalisation or globalisation or constrains them to leverage their external operations to 
imprudent levels (possibly with non-transparent, off balance sheet guarantees which become 
visible only in the glare of a financial conflagration). In respect to other capital transactions - 
including portfolio diversification and capital flight narrowly defined - three comments can 
be made:
1. tight regulation poses grave inconvenience for legitimate small transactions or - with 
currency convertibility - simply pushes them into foreign currency buying channels;
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2. with relatively free trade and convertibility of currency, small to medium transactions 
concealed in these channels cannot be prevented if bans or high transaction cost exchange 
control exist;
3. focused surveillance to identify - and forfeit - money laundering and corruption based 
transfers would have more useful systemic effects and be more effective (because more 
focused). The lowest cost, most user friendly form of portfolio currency diversification 
for most individuals and for small and medium enterprises is likely to be hard currency 
denominated deposits (in practice $ deposits with DM ones of some significance in 
Central Europe). If properly reserved with liquid external assets these are also the safest 
’external’ (external currency denominated) liabilities and the ones least likely to surge out 
in a crisis. Therefore, the case for domestic hard currency account access as an early 
attenuation of existing capital account exchange control is strong.
R EA C TIO N  AND R E C O V E R T Y : C R ISIS  M AN A G EM EN T
Ideally preventative action would create market conditions averting unsustainable inflow 
levels and composition while prudential regulation would avert systemic risk build-up 
flowing from financial and other large enterprise imprudence. As a second line of defence, 
when proactive measures flows/levels came to be seen (by the importing country Central 
Bank/Treasury) as unsustainable would either avert a real outflow crisis or lay by significant 
enough reserves and lines of credit and a prudent enough external debt time profile to ride out 
any temporary outflows.
Unfortunately while certainly reducing the number and severity of crises the proposed 
measures cannot inoculate fully against them for several reasons:
1. even if markets are fully rational they are - and will continue to be - limited by 
incomplete and or erroneous information and by lumpy flows of new information;
2. the quantity of information (of varying quality and comprehensiveness) now available is 
so large that effective retrieval, analysis and prioritisation is very difficult;
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3. the link between information and action - perceptions - has a tendency to stickiness 
followed by sharp changes i.e. inflows will overrun rational levels until increasing 
perceptions of risk finally generate a turnaround which may be very sudden and is equally 
likely to overshoot through stickiness;
4. perceptions and perception changes tend to bunch because financial institutions seek not 
simply good performance but equally avoiding performances worse than those of their 
rivals so herd in and stampede out in a way inherently likely to exacerbate volatility even 
when excess volatility does not serve most main actors’interests;
5. shocks - e.g. commodity price savings, specific industry overcapacity, key external 
market evolution (especially divergence from projections), in some emerging financial 
market cases weather or other national disaster, socio political implosion or confrontation, 
key (at least symbolically) enterprise collapse - do and will occur. They do - especially 
cum ulatively - alter economic reality (financial and real) and often alter perceptions 
(domestic and external) even more.
Therefore there is a need for pre-articulating a third stage of capital account management - 
reacting to crises which have begun in order to restrain their scope and to limit their duration.
The first issue is defining what constitutes a crisis. Depending on domestic savings levels, 
outward investment and previous projected sustainable inflow rates a small outflow may or 
may not constitute a crisis. A rapid swing from net inflows over 5% of GDP to outflows 
almost certainly does constitute a crisis, whatever reserve levels are, because the shift in 
perceptions behind such a swing is almost certain to carry it further.
The second issue is to decide in advance how long or far (in quantitative terms) to go with 
using official and institutional reserves, with drawing on external official and financial 
standbys, with market smoothing (e.g. closing trading for the day after a maximum 2.5% one 
day exchange rate shift) and with raising discount or analogous rates to levels which if held to 
beyond 30-60 days will have serious financial institution non performing debt and real 
economy recessionary impact. To begin with no set limits before taking more draconic 
action is likely to result in excessive dumping of resources into a whirlpool and of imploding 
the domestic m arket (first by reducing fixed investment and second by consequential 
domestic consumption compression).
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Determination of limits does require specific attention to pre crisis exchange rate 
(overvalued? by how much?) and inflation (how high? trend?) positions. If the currency is 
10% overvalued allowing it to fall 2’/2% a day for 4 days with no intervention until the last 
may be prudent - may because a sudden exchange rate fall tends to overshoot. Similarly 
higher inflation rates justify higher nominal interest rates and - in the presence of fiscal 
imbalance - expenditure pruning and/or phasing and perhaps increased taxation. The 1997- 
98 position has been dominantly one of clearly overvalued currencies - with the pre crisis 
exception of Indonesia - but the inflation and fiscal balance positions have varied widely.
A possible set of limits (assuming limited overvaluation inflation with current fiscal and 
account balance or surplus and investment financing requirement net over 3% of GDP) could 
be:
1. deployment of up to 10% of initial Central Bank/Government and financial institution 
reserves plus 25% drawing on pre-negotiated standbys;
2. allowing devaluation of 10% over 4 days (plus a closed weekend) with limited smoothing 
intervention,
3. subject to "1", intervention to contain the exchange rate slide to 15%;
4. setting of discount rates at 5% above inflation raised to 15% if necessary but with a limit 
of 60 days for rates substantially above 5% real (because of domestic financial system 
stability and real economy recessionary impact.
During that period the goal is to ride out the crisis with secondary adjustments using 
reserves, standbys and temporary draconic monetary policy. The transparency target is 
to present the underlying data and trends plus policy in place. The limits should not be 
publicised and the question o f fallback positions and instruments (oilier than extending 
face amount of and drawing on standbys) is probably best not articulated in any detail. If 
an international consensus on suspension and rollover to allow renegotiation/restructuring has 
been reached it would be unconvincing to assert it would never be used, but probably 
undesirable to say exactly when, how and under what circumstances. Transparency focused 
on actual reserving, provisioning and leveraging (limitation of) may except in the most 
virulent crises convince major financial institutions and investors who - even if their credit is 
short term - are in for the long haul to reflect, review and perhaps halt capital pullout. That
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depends partly on how virulent contagion is, what other shocks more specific to the particular 
economy have happened and how convincing the pre crisis transparency record has been.
Once the limits are reached a set of suspensions, rollovers and renegotiations - involving 
Central Bank/Treasury/extemal financial institutions/domestic financial institutions and other 
major externally borrowing enterprises - is appropriate. How readily a government should 
reach for this option - or complementary/alternative modes of direct intervention - depends 
partly on w hether present global dialogue does reach a de facto  consensus of the acceptability 
of external capital account payment suspension followed by inclusive roll-forward, and/or 
restructuring negotiations.
The suspension/rollover should focus on external short term liabilities and on banks 
because the form er pose immediate problems (before time to adjust or to alter projections) 
and the latter are usually the largest and most volatile capital flow channels. In respect to 
medium and short term external liabilities - except sovereign debt which should be serviced if 
at all possible including drawing on standbys - suspension of payments due during the 90 
days with paym ent to be made immediately thereafter or (on a negotiated basis) phased over 
the next two quarters should be adequate if no major borrower liquidity or solvency problem 
exists. Interest and - if possible - dividends (because they are current not capital account) 
should be paid.
The 90 days should be used to negotiate:
1. agreed rollover of short term lines of credit/interbank loans/analogous debts due over the 
90 days and the next 365 days - ideally 100% rollover but - depending on reserves and 
current account foreign exchange flow projections - at least 75%;
2. restructuring of short term debt to medium term obligations in cases (micro) in which 
clear illiquidity but probable solvency on a going concern basis pertain;
3. more radical restructuring (probably with Chapter 11 type bankruptcy or 
adm inistratorship protection) in cases of insolvency or extreme structural enterprise 
illiquidity;
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4. negotiation of additional IMF, external government or international bank consortium 
loans if projections suggest these will be needed or be prudent to have in order to allow a 
safety margin and improved external perceptions.
If commercial banks are concerned to achieve speedy results or particular forms of 
restructuring because of their national problem loan/risk rating/reserving requirements, so 
long as the overall negotiated package is acceptable these concerns should be accommodated. 
Illiquidity case negotiations should, at least in outline be capable of being completed within 
90 days but potential insolvency ones will take longer. However, the basic objective should 
be to have rollovers, restructurings and standbys adequate to allow ending overall suspension 
by the end of the 90 days. The remaining enterprise cases then do not represent government 
default or state default but the standard problem of creditors at risk because of debtor results. 
W hether this is possible depends partly on national institutional, data and personnel capacity 
and partly on with how many countries the IMF, bilateral government instrumentalities and 
financial institutions are negotiating (external financial crises tend to cluster).
As well as balance sheet liabilities, confirmed letters of credit (their continued acceptance 
by external banks) need to be addressed. Basically the goal would be to guarantee a base 
level consistent with normal external trade - and especially normal export, food supply and 
fuel sector - requirements. A desire by the external banks to exclude clearly weaker domestic 
ones cannot - if based on real risk of insolvency - be rejected out of hand as long as a floor 
level of clc’s agreed e.g. by raising the ceilings for a limited number of stable domestic and 
deep pocket domestic/external joint ventures or multinational bank subsidiaries.
Renegotiation probably needs to be divided into two clusters: bank and analogous financial 
institutions and other enterprises. The reasons are that main banks/the banking system  
cannot be allowed to fail (at least without some deposit protection and successor provision) 
and that, as a result, a much more hands on government role in credit provision level 
negotiation and in reconstruction is unavoidable.
In the case of non-bank enterprises the appropriate frame is a Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy/Administratorship legislative regime supervised by - e.g. - a strong Securities and 
Exchange Commission with access to the courts. Clearly this cannot be created instantly nor 
is it needed only during external crisis - creation and running in a domestic policy parallel to 
the preventative stage is appropriate.
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The renegotiation toward recapitalisation, restructuring or liquidation should be pragmatic 
with its goals continued operation of viable productive capacity (and associated employment) 
and maximising the medium to long term value of the operating plus sold off assets to reduce 
losses to creditors/investors/employees. This may involve new capital from existing and/or 
buy in owners, conversion of debt (to equity or convertible "tier two" subordinated 
debentures), sale of core enterprise as a going concern with agreed asset and liability package 
and/or liquidation (in whole or part). Government involvement should be as a frame set and 
mediator (separated from any government unit interest as a creditor or shareholder which 
should be presented separately like that of any other claimant).1
In the case of banks there is a more complex and direct state interest:
1. to protect depositors;
2. to avert liquidation of good banks; and
3. to ensure continued credit access for good borrowers (even when initially customers of 
bad banks);
4. to avoid overall banking system meltdown; while
5. limiting moral hazard by putting all actors, except small depositors, at real risk and 
forced to pay a real price in reconstruction or liquidation cases (the state would pay 
through unrecovered deposit insurance and recapitalisation contributions).
To achieve these aims a regulatory and monitoring/reporting structure under the Central 
Bank, a Financial Institution Authority or The Treasury is needed. Its putting in place - or 
strengthening and extension where existing - is a domestic parallel to the preventative phase 
on capital flows.
W here practicable negotiated reconstruction including new equity capital by existing or 
additional owners and possibly conversion of some loans into tier two capital (subordinated 
convertible debentures) is often the best course. It may involve a foreign partner (or foreign 
buyout) or a merger. However, a merger makes little sense unless one bank is both solvent 
by a significant margin and relatively liquid and the other (or at least the portion transferred) 
basically solvent and only moderately illiquid. Otherwise the result is likely to be the 
generalisation of weakness. In merger cases beyond Central Bank lender of last resort
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liquidity (not solvency) advances, the only appropriate state financial injections would appear 
to be second tier capital (e.g. convertible subordinated debentures).
For banks which are both illiquid and either insolvent or at real risk of becoming so, much 
more radical measures are needed. If good assets and operations can be identified these plus 
deposits and a balancing capital injection can be sold to a sound bank. In that case the rump 
bad assets would go to a "bridge" or "bad" bank to liquidate and to use the proceeds to pay 
off the deposit insurance agency, lenders and other creditors (on a preset priority schedule set 
out earlier).
In that case the equity holders and probably old tier two capital holders will be wiped out.
The interim asset transfer would presumably be medium term government paper with 
discountability at the Central Bank but possibly with limits on other sales for - say - 3 to 5 
years. That paper would be a priority claim on the "bad" bank’s proceeds and its counterpart 
value an asset of the Deposit Insurance entity.
In the case of banks which were fairly clearly insolvent with no easily separable ’good’ 
section to transfer the "bad" bank would need to take over in order to manage with a view to 
liquidation or reconstruction for future good assets/operations sale analogous to the USA 
Saving and Loan exercise. Operation is needed both to give depositors continued (or quickly 
renewed) access to their funds and to avoid ’good’ borrowers from b ad ’ banks being strangled 
by lack of access to credit. If - as may often be the case - the bank management capacity of 
the agency is very limited, it may need to transfer deposits, good loans and gap filling 
government paper to sound banks as rapidly as possibly or to hire contract management from 
sound banks (external or domestic) to augment its own capacity.
Even with substantial write downs and restructurings on loans and lines of credit together 
with conversion of part of debt to equity or tier two capital, a substantial to massive cost to 
the state is likely. Even in the USA Savings and Loan case the cost was nearly 5% of GDP 
while in the Mexican 1995-97 reconstruction it was 14% of 1997 GDP (albeit with relatively 
low external lender ’participation’in loss and relatively non-energetic pursuit of ’problem’ 
loans transferred to the state agency. So far as basic asset adequacy goes limited short term 
marketability government securities may be serviceable with conversion of a portion of non­
written down loans into tier two capital and equity from the new owners that approach should
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result in reasonably respectable balance sheets. For liquidity funding the C B ’s standard role 
of lender of last resort remains appropriate.
At some point in this process bad debts and parallel provisions should be written off. 30% 
bad loans and 25% of risk weighted asset provisions looks, and to a lesser extent is, much 
worse than 10% bad loans and 5% provisioning. This type of cleaning up can readily be 
included in cases going through the ’bad’bank and - less easily perhaps - in negotiated 
reconstructions involving loan writedowns or conversions. It is - ironically - probably 
hardest to achieve in solvent banks needing only limited CB liquidity support. However, 
continued CB access could be linked to agreement on a time bounded project for writing off 
bad assets and provisions.
Non financial (and minor financial) enterprise reconstruction and/or sellout and/or 
liquidation is a related but separate - preferably in regulation and administration as well as 
conceptualisation - requirement. The state should make plain that it accepts no liability to 
creditors or equity holders, domestic or foreign, because no public interest arguments 
analogous to interest of depositors and macro economic consequences of central financial 
institution meltdown exist. This implies it should not guarantee the exchange rate for 
external debt or principal service on such obligations (or on bank lending/lines of credit for 
that matter) as part of a general renegotiation and external debt restructuring.
There may be a need for the government to negotiate external lines of credit/clc cover for 
domestic non financial enterprises during a reactive crisis containment phase. If the realistic, 
rapid sources are external governments, regional development banks and the W orld Bank the 
government will need to act as intermediary and - in practice - assume the obligation to 
repay. It should not, however, set itself up as a commercial bank or a grant giving 
foundation. Commercial banks should on-borrow and - on their own credit risk evaluation - 
on-lend. The only risk the government need take is part of the foreign exchange risk since 
while on-lending should be denominated in the underlying borrowed currency this may need 
to be waived in part on domestic currency receipt flow enterprises if the currency falls 
radically. This writedown may be avoidable if the loan is restructured to medium/long term 
with an interest only grace period. Certainly the state/banks should insist that such loans - 
necessary for continued operation - should have preferred creditor status in the case of 
subsequent reconstruction and, if necessary, take legislation to entrench that status. Clearly 
this exception can cut significant government funds/foreign exchange flows at risk and is an
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indirect involvement in private enterprise investment. Its justification is quite simple - to risk 
working capital loans is often less risky than to risk meltdown of sound (including export) 
enterprise production exports and finance (including tax payments) because of a credit 
crunch.
During the reactive period levels o f foreign exchange asset reserving and - if write-offs 
take place - provisioning are certain to fall for both financial and other enterprises. In 
some cases - net new foreign currency deposits and/or lines of credit - 0 or 5% initial 
reserving might be prudent as during this stage unduly high inflows are most unlikely. In 
other cases some reduction is probably inevitable but oversight is needed because falling 
liquid external asset/short term external liability coverage will by itself negatively affect 
foreign perceptions, negotiations with debtors, pressures on the capital account and 
duration/depth of the crisis.
Portfolio investment should not be restricted either as to conversion from one security to 
another or into other forms of domestic assets. Nor should remittance of interest and 
dividends be restricted. Except under unusual circumstances, expatriation of portfolio sale 
proceeds should not be blocked (by the time blocking is appropriate most will have gone 
and portfolio investing funds will probably be more cautious than bankers about returning) 
and at most for 90 days as part of a general suspension.
Margin requirements (including on puts and calls) should go to 100% (i.e. 0 leverage) as 
soon as entry into reactive crisis management mode is adapted. The requirement for 
derivatives should be analogous.
Direct Central Bank/Treasury security market intervention is a last resort probably justified 
only if market shorting/exchange rate shorting are being run as a coordinated speculative 
pincer movement (as in Hong Kong) and then only for limited (stated) objectives, up to 
(unpublicised) ceiling amounts and in good quality paper. A more general tool could be 
moral suasion on long term liability matching by investors e.g. pension funds, life insurance 
companies, social security systems, Post Office Savings Banks. They could be encouraged to 
engage in selective purchases of existing (or additional recapitalisation) issues of solvent 
companies with good appreciation prospects during recovery and of medium to long term 
government paper. If moral suasion had been applied during the proactive period not to 
invest in property companies and to restrain mortgage lending, it would probably be
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appropriate to withdraw the suasion - to a neutral position unless property prices had 
collapsed below plausible medium term levels. Rollover or lengthening of mortgages on 
which the borrower could clearly pay interest but needed more time (and recovery) to meet 
capital repayment would also be appropriate moral suasion on them and on banks - a wave of 
foreclosures and fire sales against solvent but illiquid mortgagees serves nobody’s interests.
Externally denom inated accounts (in practice $) should not be blocked. If it is thought 
necessary to encourage/pressure exporters to maintain normal repatriation of proceeds this 
can be facilitated by encouraging their deposit in domestic $ accounts usable for any current 
account external (and any domestic) transaction. By removing the exchange rate risk and 
reducing the multiple conversion cost this should be much more acceptable than forced 
conversion and reduce incentives to hoard forex abroad or to prepay for imports. Any such 
regulation should be withdrawn as soon as the crisis abated e.g. 180 days renewable. To be 
relatively equitable and effective, such regulation would need to be based on historic patterns 
of direct paym ents abroad from proceeds and of external balances (notably reserving from the 
preventative period!) and set - perhaps - as a % of export proceeds to be repatriated (and 
converted or placed in domestic $ account) within X days (again related to historic on export, 
on delivery 90 day or 180 day bill payment pattern). Given that 80% to 90% of exports 
usually come from 50 to 150 enterprises this is not inherently impracticable if planned in 
advance. It is, of course, a feature of old style exchange control, but does relate to capital 
account and - with the allowability of domestic $ accounts and current transaction use - is in a 
relatively liberalised, market compatible form.
Existing direct private investment needs to be stabilised and new sought during crisis 
periods. In particular continued financing for viable - if completed - projects in progress is 
needed to avoid their becoming write-offs dragging down operating companies and 
investment banks (e.g. Peregrine) and seriously damaging lenders. Clearly not all in progress 
ventures should be completed - e.g. new chip plants - others should be redesigned to a smaller 
(at least initial) scale and many with under - say - 25% of investment cost committed 
(including deposits and contractual liabilities as well as work done) should be 
postponed/mothballed.
Direct investm ent continuation is one aspect of credit structure and future flow renegotiation 
during a 90 day suspension (or without one if the negotiation can be in the context of 
substantial bank line of credit rollover and continued CLT acceptance as in the Korean case).
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Beyond projects in progress, new long term direct investment (loan and equity) is unlikely to 
be large except in the context of external purchases - partnership or take-over - of existing 
firms and of associated guarantees of new external loan finance e.g. GEC’s expansion in hire 
purchase by take-over of Thai finance company portfolios.
In practice take-overs by bankruptcy and/or liquidation, as opposed to negotiated settlements, 
are less than likely unless the state (usually via a bad bank/bad financial institution scheme) 
has first ’nationalised’ the assets (as in the GEC case). Buyouts of pre-existing and buying 
into new joint ventures (as in Korea) seem more likely.
This is an area in which state facilitation largely means not blocking by rules seriously 
hampering dfi and/or negotiated bankruptcy settlement under the general surveillance of 
regulatory commissions and courts which are prompt, proper and predictable. All three 
p ’s are key - e.g. the Philippine courts at this level are proper but - because of the plethora of 
reviews possible - not prompt and are perceived to be unpredictable. There is no case for the 
state as such recapitalising non financial enterprises nor for it (as opposed to regulatory 
commissions and courts) judging the equitability to domestic investors of external capital 
restructuring/buyout proposals. Exceptions on macro or regional (sub national region) 
grounds should be very few and far between especially if the external purchases proposes to 
operate the acquired enterprise on a substantially comparable scale. Local employment and 
purchases and exports after all depend on whether the enterprise is operating or not and on 
what scale very much more than on who owns it.
It is valid to argue that injection of new domestic equity or second tier capital (e.g. 
subordinated, convertible, cumulative, payable when/if earned debentures) may allow a better 
deal for domestic parties. It is valid for a regulatory body to favour such a route. It is 
unlikely to be a prudent use of state funds except for large already state owned, or 
substantially owned enterprises and there because of the role as owner. E.g. the Philippine 
government is right to decline to contemplate investing in Philippine Airlines but - were it 
seen as key to restructuring National Power into several units for early partial placement and 
flotation at acceptable prices - might think it plausible to restructure its loans to National 
Power and/or inject new second tier subordinated convertible debt funding.
By the same token governments should limit extra incentives to foreign investors - especially 
ones not in practice available to domestic. Take or pay, dollar denominated utility contracts
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are a glaring example. These place the entire growth projection and more than the entire 
currency risk on the state (unless the currency can plausibly be expected to appreciate against 
the dollar). 80% take or pay, 20% guaranteed available at 10% over base price, hard 
currency denominated payment for external debt (interest and principal) proportion of cost 
(base 80% only) and a domestic inflation minus - say - 2% formula for the remaining 
proportion of the price would be a much more equitable form and are carrying much less 
fiscal and forex risk to the state. Similarly proposals for the state to guarantee debt taken 
over or issued by incoming foreign investors should be rejected flatly and fully.
M onetary/credit policy in the reactive/crisis containment period faces four tasks, at least two 
partially conflicting:
1. a low enough real interest rate to avoid driving solvent, inherently viable enterprises 
into bankruptcy; increasing bank bad debt morasses leading to a generalised credit crunch 
and some otherwise needless bank failures and undermining/constraining fiscal policy;
2. a high enough interest rate to commend external credibility and avoid continued capital 
flight or leakage at levels sustainable only briefly;
3. ensuring credit availability - including to banks and financial institutions - is adequate 
to avoid deepening recession, unemployment and capacity underutilisation and to avoid 
bankrupting solvent and inherently (without a depression and with a recovery in - say - 2 
years) enterprises;
4. enforcing discipline to underline the costs of imprudent lending/borrowing and to require 
balance sheet reconstruction.
While the last goal is better handled by prudential regulatory policy than by interest rates 
there is an inherent tension between the first two goals while failure in respect to either of 
them puts the third at risk.
Temporary suspension of external capital repayments reduces the forex demand and reduces 
the pressure on interest rates. Reconstruction - including debt profile lengthening and 
debt/equity swaps - does the same more sustainably. This is especially likely to be the case if 
lenders can be convinced - in the renegotiation context - that non rollover of credit lines and 
imposition of even short term interest rates over the 15%-20% range will increase bank bad
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debts (and the number of bad banks) and reduce solvency of non-financial borrowers neither 
of which is in their interests.
Moral suasion has limits and should not be used to push banks (especially weak banks) into 
borrowing at high rates from foreign banks and relending at lower ones in domestic currency. 
True, their main customers are not the marginal loan recipients and can prudently be charged 
at nearer the (lower) average cost of lendable funds but - beyond making that point and 
suggesting more differentiation in rates based on better risk assessment - the safe role of 
moral suasion seems somewhat limited. (If a bank cartel is operating - a margin of much 
over 5% or over between Treasury Bill rates and prime enterprise borrower rates is prima 
fac ie  evidence as is a similar gap between long term deposit and prime lending rates - there is 
a case for pressure but under competition legislation not crisis containing moral suasion.)
In fiscal as in monetary policy a crisis period tradeoff arises between increasing real and 
perceived external and financial sector robustness and limiting falls in fixed investment and 
employment and increases in poverty. The purpose of interim barrier erection between the 
domestic and global capital market is to gain some room for manoeuvre. How much is 
possible depends on:
1. pre crisis fiscal balance
2. sources of borrowing (and time profile of debt)
3. probability of inflationary impact of fiscal relaxation (interacting with devaluation, higher 
interest rates and a recession in domestic demand).
The likelihood that fiscal surpluses (probably even on recurrent account including interest) 
are unambiguously desirable is very low under the conditions posited - pace the IMF which 
has, grudgingly and slowly accepted that reality in East Asia even if its initial fiscal/monetary 
prescriptions for Thailand, Indonesia, Korea included ice packs as a cure for hypothermia 
(just as mediaeval surgeons prescribed leeches for anaemia). The question is what levels of 
public debt creation neither destroy investor (domestic and foreign) confidence, aggravate the 
domestic credit crunch nor kindle lasting double digit (especially over 15%) inflation.
The two main areas in which enhanced spending is likely to be needed are:
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1. construction/civil engineering investment in infrastructure (including but not limited to 
labour intensive, employment - livelihood protecting quasi safety net programmes);
2. poverty reduction/livelihood shock alleviations measures to sustain access to basic food, 
health, education and water whether by lowering charges, subsidising poor household 
cash flows or interacting with infrastructure creation.
Given probable rises in unemployment and the specific patterns of demand likely to be 
sustained neither appears to be inherently inflationary. The key macro demand fall is in fact 
normally fixed investment (down one third in the defanged Tigers in 1998 versus at most a 
twentieth for domestic consumption) but the leading social (socio economic) challenge is 
likely to be livelihood/wage employment narrowing or degradation. Taken together these 
require a two focus package of spending, overlapping in the labour intensive small scale 
infrastructure area.
Clearly the greater the relatively soft, medium to long term external capital mobilisation 
possible the greater the degrees of fiscal freedom. For low income and perhaps lower middle 
provision o f such finance for infrastructure and some poverty alleviation/reduction measures 
is a stated W orld Bank and Regional Development Bank priority. Pure safety net survival 
funding arguably should be external grant or domestic tax financed - its contribution to future 
fiscal revenue can be very real, but is neither direct nor all that convincing to financial 
institutions.
Successful reactive/crisis containment policy and praxis logically leads back to a new 
’preventative’ phase - ’preventative’ because for some years (not necessarily as many as might 
be supposed) excessive - or even adequate/optimal - levels of inflow are not probable. 
However the monitoring transparency, reserving, provisioning - and
reconstruction/liquidation of insolvent enterprises to avert a build-up creating problems later - 
operations should be kept in full force. A post crisis containment lethargy is only too likely
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to allow new weaknesses and/or vulnerabilities to accumulate (e.g. Mexico 1996-97) and to 
provide the entry point for new shock wedges (in that case Asian crisis and petroleum price 
decline). Financial flow disasters are no more one off and non-repetitive than natural ones 
such as droughts and floods. International coordination of monitoring, information 
presentation and standard setting combined with (literally) standby loans/lines of credit for 
proactive crisis avoidance can reduce the frequency, the depth and - hopefully especially - the 
contagion epidemic effects of financial flow reversal. They cannot eliminate them.
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ANNEX A
HIPC/HIBS/HIRAS - Avalanche Overhang
The current financial flow reversal crisis has tended to push the Highly Indebted Poor 
Country debt writedown initiative out of focused attention. That is inevitable - the crisis 
threatens the global financial system and could lead to a global recession, H IPC’s are neither 
large enough nor globally involved enough to do either. Even they would not benefit if 
negotiating debt writedown for Tanzania and the programm e’s extension to Nigeria were 
carried on at the expense of halting the dodgem car knock on collisions that began in July 
1997 when the baht crashed and burnt in Bangkok.
Basically the HIPC process is complementary to, or even a precondition for, the preventative 
proposals. If present debt service met is crushing or large amounts of arrears have piled/are 
piling up in semi condoned, de facto  default, then prudent medium term planning - by states 
or enterprises - is not practicable and the overhang reduces confidence. If now paid, it would 
be unsustainable; if now suspended but not written off, its future reactivation could crush 
currently sustainable balance of payments patterns. In the second case provisioning and 
reserving by raising foreign asset holdings could be feared to make claims for renewed debt 
service more likely.
However, the multiple fragilities re-exposed over 1997-200? Suggest HIPC needs to be 
deepened (remaining debt service is too high for robustness in the face of climatic, relative 
price or macroeconomics environmental shocks), widened (by open ended entry provisions 
for countries now not eligible because they have or until recently have had no functioning 
governments, not because they are not poor and highly indebted), speeded up (at least by 
freezing payments due to be written down during the 6 years to eligibility period and 
probably shortening that period) and structurally adjusted for post conflict or collapse 
economies (e.g. to ask for macro structural soundness of policy for six years from Congo ex 
Zaire, Somaliland, Rwanda and - presently - Sudan before HIPC writedowns is to create a 
Catch 22 situation and to present the early support necessary - even if not sufficient - for 
rehabilitation and reconciliation to have a chance). HIPC needs to be more robust because 
the global economic climate is stormier than previous! \ i erceived but in ways that were 
largely already identifiable. Similarly border line cs such as Nigeria (both as to how poor 
ad whether its 93-98 period is analogous to civil war or total state disintegration) might also
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uselully be considered for inclusion. (The 6 year role on entry into force of HIPC is 
mordantly am using given the IMF objection to the Clinton pre crisis standready financial 
package in place proposals unless all such facilities lapse in 12 to 24 months because country 
policies change so markedly and rapidly.)
Broader debt reduction in the context of short term financial tsunami is an issue much 
more integrally related to global investment flow issues. It is a different issue because the 
countries involved are primarily - in terms of GDP, trade and financial flows - lower middle 
or even middle income; the debts involved are primarily mixed non financial enterprise and 
financial enterprise not sovereign and the initial time profile of the bulk of the debt at risk 
ranges from on dem and to 18 months. That means more actors in any renegotiation and 
broader/more com plicated writedown/restructurings. Further, if restructuring takes place 
prudently and promptly enough to avert a full blown crisis general writedowns are not 
necessarily a central issue:
1. for the bulk o f the borrowings guaranteed 90% rollover for 24 months and/or 
restructuring half of 0-365 day, debt to 365-1800 day with rollover on the other 50%, may 
very well be adequate to overcome what is in ouch cases an illiquidity rather than an 
insolvency problem. That type of restructuring involves no real loss to the lenders unless 
the new rates are lower - indeed by avoiding disorderly default and devaluation it saves 
them money;
2. for some enterprises the issue is indeed can’t pay or at least can’t pay in full not just need 
more time to pay, because the enterprise for whatever reason is insolvent as well as 
illiquid. Alternatively it can be solvent only with a 1 to 3 year (lower) interest payment 
only period to adjust to terms of trade (on visibles and/or on debt service) shocks 
inducting devaluation. In these cases the most practicable form of debt writedown and 
the one m ost consistent with debtor/creditor cooperation to maximise value for each 
available five to ten years down the road is likely to be converting portions o f short and 
m edium /long term debt to either equity or "tier two" subordinated, convertible, 
cum ulative, subordinated debentures or income notes (or into equity which is simpler but 
not necessarily tax or confidence risk efficient for either lenders or debtors) while 
restructuring short term project finance duration to fit project cash flow and creating more 
stable w orking capital access. As the types and degrees of alternation will vary widely
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with the initial structure, the post shock viability of the borrower and the time frame for 
recovery HIPC type macro generalisations cannot be applied to individual cases.
In this type of renegotiation/restructuring of non-sovereign debt it is perverse to speak of the 
government as being "in default" even if it chooses to use a 90 day suspension of principal 
payments to create a context conducive to more orderly negotiation. No one has seriously 
asserted South Korea was in default when it called for and to a large extent secured such a 
process with the implicit warning of a suspension had the creditors not responded. To 
assume that - with the Rupiah then at R15,000 = $1 and plunging - Indonesian non 
suspension would have meant continued non-sovereign debt service is preposterous. Only a 
handful of export focused companies or substantial external asset holders could possibly have 
done so for more than a few weeks. For a state to assert that to minimise loss to debtors and 
creditors an orderly renegotiation among creditors and debtors mediated by the state 
(and perhaps an international financial entity) and perhaps backed by an interim suspension 
of principal repayment is necessary is neither nonsense, confiscation nor per se anti market 
or anti creditor. The present problem is in general the lack of agreed guidelines as to when 
such a suspension can be justified (and who can "validate" it albeit the only present 
practicable answer is clearly the IMF) and what the processual and time parameters for 
restructuring should and in specific the confiscatory, anti external debtor, unlevel internal 
playing field non negotiated enforcement of non-sovereign (as well as partial sovereign) 
default by Russia.
But H IPC’s and even HIPM E’s (Highly Illiquid Poor Middle Economies) are only one aspect 
of problems which - unless addressed now - will hamper or prevent Preventative and 
Proactive action to avert (or at least reduce and control) the next external short term financial 
flow crisis. Two others are:
1. HIBS (Highly Insolvent Banking Systems); and
2. HIRAS (Highly Inadequate Regulatory and Audit Systems).
At present the banking systems of Thailand, South Korea and Indonesia are massively 
insolvent while those of M alaysia and, to a lesser extent, the Philippines are at risk. While 
restructuring is in progress in Thailand and South Korea the cost on direct data and the 
Mexican "tequila! Analogue suggest 15% of GDP will be needed to re-establish credible 
balance sheets and the confidence to lend prudently (as opposed to ultra conservatively and
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very little or recklessly and massively in hope something - other than size and depth of holes 
- will turn up). The situation in many poor countries (including a majority of H IPC’s_ is just 
as bad; only a minority have (with World Bank sectoral lending and Treasury security 
injections) carried out even moderately convincing banking sector restructuring.
Reconstruction is needed quite apart from the short term external financial flows issues. An 
insolvent banking system (or indeed are in danger of tipping to insolvency) can only continue 
to provide credit even to good enterprises as long as its insolvency remains unknown to its 
depositors and creditors (who will learn soon after its manager and regulators because of 
leaks to "cronies") or so long as it uses very limited external finance and its domestic 
creditors are reassured by a credible, open ended government guarantee to inject finance and 
liquidity (presumably by providing government paper to fill balance sheet holes and proceeds 
of government paper sold to others to bolster liquidity). That is hardly a prudent (as it 
encourages continued imprudent and/or unanalysed lending) or a sustainable (given the likely 
escalation of the burden on the Treasury and its limited access to non-bank lenders) position.
In most o f these cases three external inputs are needed;
1. advice on and personnel to take part in restructuring to support whatever domestic body is 
responsible;
2. finance to com plement domestic resources in recapitalisation and meaningful deposit 
insurance system creation;
3. enterprise (i.e. foreign bank) involvement whether by new entry, expansion, strategic 
stake holding or take-over to augment limited (even after reconstruction) domestic 
personnel and financial capabilities, to broaden the range of services - especially 
international market oriented ones - and to provide competition and standards for 
judgem ent in what have, at best, been sleepy, protected markets (including for long 
established foreign banks).
A scorched earth policy - instant liberalisation and new foreign bank conquest of the market - 
is rarely feasible. The depositors of the failed domestic (and often old foreign) banks would 
still need to be compensated. Creating retail branch banking in low and lower middle income 
countries is not seen (perhaps wrongly) as attractive by most internationally expansive banks 
(South African are exceptions, Malaysian were and HSBC under certain circumstances might
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be). Many viable domestic enterprises would be at severe risk of failing before they could 
establish working capital finance relations with the new banks. With no serious regulatory 
system (especially for externally based banks) in place the countries would be at grave risk of 
plundering by new BCCI’s and lesser operators of that ilk.
The reasons for requiring external information and supporting personnel are obvious. 
Those for capital to reconstruct/set up deposit insurance may be less so. These are 
basically domestic currency costs, and to the extent reconstruction is successful, they can be 
met by issuing medium to long term government securities. That issue would not per se be 
inflationary because filled balance sheet holes do not necessarily lead to more lending let 
alone more propensity for depositors to pull their money to stuff mattresses or to increase 
consumption. To a degree the same holds for initial period underwriting/guaranteeing of 
deposit insurance. Presumptively if payouts are needed they will in large part be redeposited 
not spent and if deposits plus backing are transferred to sound banks they can hold the 
medium/long term paper.
However, two factors qualify the premise of suitability for domestic finance very 
substantially. First reconstruction cost is likely to be 15% of GDP (e.g. Mexico 1995, 
estimated Korea 1998 assuming ultimate recovery of 50% of problem loans, Thailand 1998, 
M alaysia 200?). That type of leap in sovereign borrowing/GDP ratios does have an impact 
on markets even if the short term impact on domestic demand is negligible. Second the 
purpose of reconstruction is to enable commercial banks to return to playing their role in a 
market economy - providing working capital and financial services to viable enterprises. 
Therefore, a portion of the recapitalisation will (and should) need to be liquid to promote real 
economy as well as bank security recovery. In a depressed economy such increases in 
lending to productive enterprises may not be particularly inflationary, but state borrowing 
(whether domestic or external) from non bank sources to finance them is likely to run into 
monetary, fiscal and credit market constraints.
The main source and mobiliser of financial sector reconstruction loans and main advisor on 
sectoral reconstruction has to date been the World Bank. This is not as surprising as it may 
seem at first glance. Financial institution reconstruction and regulation is in implementation 
dominantly, and in design substantially, micro/sectoral which is the Bank’s side of the 
smudged line in the sand division of labour with the IMF. As a result of this history the Bank 
has more experience and expertise on how to rebuild institutionally and in detail and how to
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finance than does the Fund. More macro coordination with the Fund - and more use by the 
Fund of SAF/ESAF for financial section reconstruction rather than as a smaller less 
efficiently targeted or monitored IDA - is desirable, but there is no reason the Bank should 
not be involved in institutional recapitalisation, relaunching and regulation simply because 
the enterprises in question are banks not factories or ports.
HIRAS - highly inadequate regulatory and audit systems - have not received very much 
articulated "how to" attention at country level despite the fact that at an optimistic 
estimate 150-175 of the 200 odd global territorial entities (including the wilful HIRAS of 
such offshore havens as e.g. Cayman, Surinam, Turks and Caicos, Jersey, Guernsey and - one 
must fear - the offshore platforms appended to distinctly non HIRA domestic financial 
markets such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Ireland, which have not had transparency and 
disclosure rules adequate for national regulators to know what scorpions are hidden under 
rocky banks and rotting hedge funds) are HIRAS.
So long as a country is a HIRAS with the best regulatory and policy will in the world, and 
with otherwise well designed enterprise friendly, social cohesion positive strategy and 
practice, its government is very likely to find itself unexpectedly confronting a HIBS. 
Certainly it cannot operate any of the preventative, proactive and reactive policy packages 
proposed in the main text since it will back data let alone legal or practical enforcement 
powers.
Turning HIRAS into ARAS (Adequately Regulated and Audited Systems) is time and 
personnel consum ing and a multi (3 to 5 minimum) year process. It is unlikely to be 
possible for most countries individually (or to be particularly effective regionally or globally) 
without both coordination as to standards and mobilisation of data and personnel to assist - 
and to m onitor - national processes. A possible set of coordinating for a would be the 
regional development banks regionally and the World Bank globally. However, each would 
need to coordinate with national regulators (and their international for a) to secure both "best 
practice" guidelines and a pool of experienced personnel for secondment and monitoring 
operations.
Some of the aspects of ARAS particularly relevant to recording, monitoring, reporting and 
managing international capital flows (especially short term enterprise sector ones) have been
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addressed in the main text. A complete approach would require a textbook not a part of an 
Annex.
However the need for agreed best practice and possible accepted variants on it can be 
illustrated by treatment of "problem" loans. Treatment in regulatory systems of some 
substance ranges from 30 days overdue on principal or interest or within three years of 
restructuring to 90 days overdue on principal and interest (and with no recent restructuring 
provision).
The first may be too conservative - especially in systems which have had recent 
reconstructions and recapitalisations with a substantial proportion of loans being and likely to 
continue to be serviced but reconstructed. The latter can be dangerously lax (especially when 
substituted for a tigher definition in a context of rising "problem" loans and moral suasion to 
continue lending to weak borrowers and to roll forward their principal repayment schedules - 
as in Malaysia). But it may well be a range of choices is acceptable so long as there is full 
disclosure both of the definition used of what the figure would be on major alternative 
definitions. Similarly the complexity of regulations/regulatory processes and the use of 
banks as proxies (e.g. to enforce leverage limitations on non bank financial and non financial 
enterprises who borrow from them) may well need to be articulated differently by region and 
by the degree of development of the national financial system. Again there is still a need for 
transparent explanation of the regulations and procedures and of their differences from 
Northwestern best practice (assuming a certain consistency of best practice rules among the 
USA, Canada and main EU members hopefully extending in the future to Japan).
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A N N EX B
FINANCIAL FOLLY, GENERALISED OVERCAPACITY, CONSPICUOUS SAVING  
OR MOSAIC?
One interpretation of the 1995-200? Economic crisis is in terms of generalised overcapacity 
whether pursuing the Hayekian business cycle model or its origin in (ironically) M arx’s 
unfinished draft of Das Kapital - Volume III. The Marxian model turns on a rising ratio of 
savings to (subsistence level and numbers constrained) consumption interacting with higher 
productivity (raising output at any given number of workers and, therefore, of consumption) 
and with higher fixed to circulating capital ratios (inevitable if output per worker rises and 
wages do not) which lowers the rate of surplus value extraction on total capital. Hayek - like 
any other economist not following a rigid subsistence wage thesis and/or allowing amenity 
and conspicuous consumption by capitalists - has a less inevitable juggernaut, driven by 
rising savings by enterprises and individuals outstripping the growth of consumption and 
therefore generating overcapacity initially in final goods but reacting back for greater final 
revealed overcapacity in investment goods.
This pair of models were until recently viewed as curiosities. Inventory cycles, wave effect 
overcapacity in specific industries, declining sector overcapacity ere taken seriously as was 
generalised national overcapacity resulting from bad macro policy leading to unsustainable 
external imbalance and rigid production structures were taken seriously. The Marx-Hayek 
models were not beyond limited for left and for right true believers.
But from 19975 there has been a revival in overcapacity based argumentation citing South 
Africa, automobiles, South Korea, steel, M alaysia, IT chips, Japan, property, China etc. The 
argument is not simply that in decline capacity is underutilised because of the decline but that 
general overinvestment has led to unutiliseable capacity and thus caused the decline. In 
this perspective the financial flow crisis is a secondary/consequential effect a rising from 
the late realisation that much investment was inherently non viable.
Is this a valid general perspective? There are sunset or at least post noon industries like steel 
with new arguably competitive entrants exceeding downward rationalisation. There are easy 
entry/high demand growth/rapid technologic;)! change industries like pc’s and chips in which 
prices and demand for some lines have plummeted while capacity exploded. In cases like
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automobiles large new entries seeking scale while existing units sought consolidate and raise 
productivity with few, if any, capacity cuts have led to global overcapacity. There are - as 
there have always been - property booms. More generally concern for market share and 
output expansion nominally (but possibly neither realistically nor convincingly) justified by 
long term profitability/survival have led to capacity expansion a shorter time focus, higher 
discount rate, more cautious market expansion analysis strategy would not have undertaken. 
But is there generalised overcapacities globally or in most peripheral economies?
On balance no. The USA and EU have pockets of overcapacity in subsiding areas (e.g. 
Appalachia, W allonia) and industries (e.g. steel) and problematic areas in which the fight for 
survival/market share has, at least for the present, interacted with new entrants to create 
overcapacity (e.g. pc’s, chips). But over 1995-1998 these economies have not been held back 
by excess capacity/stagnant domestic demand. Nor until the 1997 crisis was Asia 
characterised by stagnant domestic demand - au contraire. Apart from chips and automobiles 
serious inherent overcapacity was evident only in South Korea and Japan albeit Thailand, 
M alaysia and perhaps Indonesia, Hong Kong and Singapore arguably constituted additional 
overinvestment cases. Certainly the Russian, Venezuelan, Ecuadorian, Mexican and 
Brazilian cases of 1998 do not look much like the Hayek-Marx model. Nor does South 
Africa whose capacity problem focuses under the (broadly defined) national economic 
defence industries built up under apartheid in a context of growing global economic closing 
(to and by SA) and now increasing economic opening.
However, a characteristic of several economies now in crisis or depression - South Korea, 
Hong Kong, Japan, China, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia - has been savings rates 
of 30% to over 50% o f GDP. Combined with easy access to foreign finance and a high (self 
justifying as long as investment remains high) growth of capacity, output and domestic (as 
well as export demand) these savings levels did lead to what Alan Greenspan describes as 
"overexuberance" not just in commercial and residential buildings and financial 
instruments but also in power plants, factories and toll roads. Savings and their 
investment had arguably become the ’New Conspicuous Consumption’ to mutate 
Veblen. But this pattern was neither global nor tied umbilically either to foreign funds 
inflow nor to boom - wide post bubble Japan where the prudential savings level and market 
share/power investment levels have indeed impeded recovery based on or substantially
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sustained by domestic demand. There may be elements of Marx/Hayek but only in a very 
general sense.
1995 (dating back to the Tequila crisis which in retrospect seems the first stage of the more 
contagious Defanging of the Tigers crisis/catalyst) onward appears a mosaic with certain 
general characteristics and certain contextual specificities linked and catalysed by 
financial flows unprecedented (in and out) as to volume, global reach and volatility.
Direct private investment while concentrated in a handful of countries did begin to globalise - 
$2,500 million in two projects (aluminium smelter and natural gas production/pipeline) in 
Mozambique and about $500 million in gold mines build-up (toward 600,000 oz. a year 
before 2005) in Tanzania may be trivial globally but in each case the investment exceed GDP 
(by several fold for Mozambique). Footloose financial capital globalised even more 
dramatically. When - as was true for several years in the mid 1990’s Kenya, Uganda and 
Tanzania have net sales to external buyers of local currency denominated short term 
government paper clearly access - at a price - is more open in kind, not just degree, than in 
the 1980’s or 1970’s let alone the 1960’s or 1950’s.
1. very high savings rates in some countries which together with easy access to foreign 
exchange led to inherently unsustainable property, power, transport and manufacturing 
investment together with currency overvaluation increasingly hampering both export 
growth and holding domestic market share (especially in a context of liberalisation);
2. increasing fragility of many financial systems partly caused by and partly causing 
reduced care in risk evaluation and frenetic expansion/diversification/intermediation to 
raise profits and trade out of trouble (at least in intent);
3. liberalisation o f trade and financial markets, on a scale and at a pace with which 
many protected produced economies with rigidities were ill suited to cope and in
which most recipients and suppliers of finance acted with remarkably little sombre risk 
analysis or attempts to understand history to avoid repeating it;
4. a degree of long termism (including permanent expansion), turnover and market share 
focus which has eroded attention to prudent cash flow, leveraging limit and 
profitability projections and to risk from external shocks and/or halts to growth. The
same weakness has appeared on the social side. Increased employment - at least in Asia 
from 1950’s Japan through 1990’s Indonesia - has been so sustained and so effective at
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reducing poverty levels that few Asian countries (Singapore and - to a less degree - Japan 
are partial exceptions) have even minimal national social safety nets. At best this leads to 
focus on pain sharing (Thai preference for severe way cuts and modest redundancies 
which may be socially less corrosive but may or may not be enterprise cost/productivity 
effective) and at worst to explosive tensions (e.g. in somewhat different ways Indonesia 
and Malaysia) because job  loss drags down both directly hit and extended families into 
the poverty abyss they believed they had escaped - and the government claimed credit and 
earned legitimacy for facilitating/causing that escape. As the World Bank is still 
discovering a crisis may heighten the need for a basic safety net but is not the most 
propitious setting for seeking to establish one.
5. a decade o f drag from the w orld’s second largest economy (Japan) whose export surplus 
became as much a result of domestic demand stagnation as of competitiveness and whose 
high savings rate contributed both to domestic demand deliquescence and to plugging 
the gaps its external current account surplus created by purchasing securities 
(especially $ ones) and investing (shifting additional production abroad) directly in 
external production facilities.
These elements - plus such narrower factors as Brazil’s chronically high state borrowing 
requirement and the ’godfather’ economy in Russia - for a time sustained each other and rapid 
growth in world trade and output in much of the periphery and some parts of the OECD core. 
But over time the cracks and contradictions become more apparent and confidence more 
brittle. The Tequila crisis raised a few doubts and led to no significant systemic reform; the 
Tiger crisis put confidence on a knife edge; the Russian economic house of cards’collapse set 
off a near lemming flight to quality, exacerbated by/as well as leading to the LTCM near 
collapse.
The partial distraction of attention in the USA is a contributory non-economic factor. 
However, M essrs Clinton, Robin and Greenspan appear to be directing high quality and 
coherence analysis to the global economic trajectory and doing more to increase the chances 
of averting meltdown than any other country or institution so placing a heavy emphasis on 
Monicagate may be misleading. Indeed it is arguable that only the totemic faith of US 
individuals and institutions in Greenspan and therefore in his action to bail out those who 
would have been massively hit by the disorderly unwinding of LTCM (and in its whirlpool 
other ’hedge’ funds) and following up by two (even if small) interest rate cuts has averted a
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Kredit Anstalt collapse and financial system meltdown rerun. To date his mirror image 
Joshua trumpeting T hey shall not fall’outside the New York Financial citadel (with some 
zither accompaniment by Brown and Blair) has worked well (whatever one thinks of its 
logic) but assuming it does lead to a ’new promised land’of restored global financial stability 
an institutional and systemic replacement is needed - convincing prophets to counteract 
financial fear cannot be produced on call.
In the end while the tendencies to overinvestment (and oversaving) in some countries is a 
contributory factor and a real economy/financial system bridge the basic link both in the 
upswing and now does appear to be international financial flows. The psychology 
(parallel exuberant entry followed by parallel terrified attempted exit) has been familiar 
enough for 150 years or more since the first waves of investment in post colonial Latin 
America, Canada, the USA, Australia, Central Europe, and (somewhat later) South Africa. 
One may be tempted to cite John Law, tulips and the South Sens (or for LCTM the Company 
with the highly profitable objective but not to be disclosed) but that is somewhat misleading - 
except perhaps for Russia and LTCM - as those were Ponzi schemes or pure rip-offs. This 
has not characterised most 1990’s lending. W hatever else can be said of them loans to 
Korean chaebol and even Indonesian Eirst Family enterprises’and Pergau Dam did go to 
construct capital assets which did produce and were (however over-exuberantly) also 
expected to produce profits and cash flows to service/repay debt.. The differences are 
globalisation (coverage as to country and as to enterprise sector), quantity (absolutely and 
relative to international trade and, eve more, production), obscurity (with numbers of new 
actors and new instruments outstripping increased data flow) and unexamined liberalisation 
(tearing down administrative intervention before designing transparency and prudential 
regulation substitutes let alone putting them in place).
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